Yes, my history was Linux 95-04, Mac 04-15, and now back to Linux from 2015 onwards.Its been clear Tim Cook was going to slowly harm the brand. He was a wonderful COO under a visionary CEO-type, but he holds no particular &quot;Tech Originalist&quot; vision. He&#x27;s happy to be part of the BigTech aristocracy, and probably feels really at home in the powers it affords him.Anyone who believes this is &quot;just about the children&quot; is naive. His chinese partners will use this to crack down on &quot;Winnie the Poo&quot; cartoons and the like...before long questioning any Big Pharma product will result in being flagged. Give it 5 years at max.

I knew that eventually it&#x27;d probably matter what devices I used, I just didn&#x27;t expect it to be so soon.But yeah, I could reasonably use an iphone without impact for the foreseeable future with some small changes.

I think no matter what devices you use, you&#x27;ve nailed down the most important part of things which is using apps and services that are flexible, and can be easily used on another platform.

That&#x27;s not really the issue. The issue is that for google maps to work properly, it requires that the Play services are installed. Play services are a massive semi-monolithic blob that requires tight integration with Google&#x27;s backend, and deep, system-level permissions to operate correctly.I&#x27;m not worried about my search history.

In addition to F-Droid, you can get Aurora Store (which is on F-Droid) which lets you use an anonymous login to get at the Play Store. I use it for a couple free software apps that aren&#x27;t on F-Droid for some reason.

&gt;While I still use google mapsYou can still use Google Maps without an account and &quot;incognito&quot;. I wish they&#x27;d allow app store usage without an account though- similar to how any Linux package manager works.

Freenas, self-signed tightly-scoped CA installed on all of my devices. 1TBx4 in a small case shoved under the stairs.tbh, i would vastly prefer to use a cloud based service with local encryption - I&#x27;m not super paranoid, just overly principled

Yeah, but it&#x27;s also useful for getting my friends on board. I think it&#x27;s likely that I eventually start hosting matrix or some alternative, but my goal is to be practical here, yet still have a privacy protecting posture.

&gt; Signal is still a centralised data silo where by default you trust CA to verify your contacts identify.You can verify the security number out-of-band, and the process is straightforward enough that even nontechnical users can do it.That&#x27;s as much as can possibly be done, short of an app that literally prevents you from communicating with anyone without manually providing their security number.

Signal is still a centralised data silo where by default you trust CA to verify your contacts identify.

Nearly the same as MagicEarth...I use it all the time.

Does it let you select from multiple routes? I&#x27;ve been using Pocketmaps, but it only gives you a single option for routing, which can lead to issues in certain contexts

I&#x27;m impressed, it actually has smooth scrolling unlike OsmAnd which is very slow loading tiles in.Critical points I&#x27;d make about Organic Maps, I&#x27;d want a lower inertia setting so it scrolls faster, and a different color palette.. they are using muddy tones of green and brown.

And I also invite everyone to contribute to OSM through StreetComplete, it&#x27;s quite intuitive and it adds something to look for when taking a walk.

Organic Maps on Fdroid is a really clean osm based map.

I&#x27;m using since many years HERE Maps <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;wego.here.com&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;wego.here.com&#x2F;</a>

I really like Here WeGo, and it allows you to download maps for specific countries too to have available offline.

Organic maps is pretty good:
<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;organicmaps&#x2F;organicmaps" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;organicmaps&#x2F;organicmaps</a>

Have you found any decent google maps alternatives? I&#x27;d love to find something but nothing comes close as far as I&#x27;ve found. Directions that take into account traffic is the big thing that I feel like nobody (other than Apple, MS, etc.) will be able to replicate.Have you tried using the website? I&#x27;ve had some luck with that on postmarketOS, and it means you don&#x27;t need to install Play services to use it.

I don&#x27;t think it&#x27;s implausible that I carry around a phone that has mail, contacts, calendars, photos, and private chat on it. And then, have a second, older phone that has like Instagram and mobile games. It&#x27;s tragic.

Loosing sight of the forest for this one tree.1) Google doesn&#x27;t release devices without unlockable bootloaders. They have always been transparent in allowing people to unlock their Nexus and Pixels. Nexus was for developers, Pixels are geared towards the end user. Nothing changed with regards to the bootloaders.2) Google uses Coreboot for their ChromeOS devices. Again, you couldn&#x27;t get more open than that if you wanted to buy a Chromebook and install something else on it.3) To this day, app sideloading on Android remains an option. They&#x27;ve even made it easier for third party app stores to automatically update apps with 12.4) AOSP. Sure, it doesn&#x27;t have all the bells and whistles as the latest and greatest packaged up skin and OS release, but all of the features that matter within Android, especially if you&#x27;re going to de-Google yourself, are still there.Any one of those points, but consider all four, and I have trouble understanding why people think REEEEEEEE Google.So you can&#x27;t play with one ball in the garden (SafetyNet), you&#x27;ve still got the rest of the toys. That&#x27;s a compromise I&#x27;m willing to accept in order to be able to do what I want to and how I want to do it. (Eg, Rooting or third party roms.)If you don&#x27;t like what they do on their mobile OS, there&#x27;s nothing that Google is doing to lock you into a Walled Garden to where the only option you have is to completely give up what you&#x27;re used to......Unlike Apple. Not one iOS device has been granted an unlockable bootloader. Ever.

&gt; We&#x27;ve collectively handed control of our personal computing devices over to Apple and GoogleHey now, the operating system and app distribution cartels include Microsoft, too.

Unfortunately with SafetyNet, I feel like an investment into Android is also a losing proposition...I can only anticipate being slowly cut off from the Android app ecosystem as more apps onboard with attestation.We&#x27;ve collectively handed control of our personal computing devices over to Apple and Google. I fear the long-term consequences of that will not be positive...

So they should do that scanning server side at their boundary instead of pushing software to run on phones with potential to extend scope later if no push back.

That&#x27;s not the issue. The issue is that they have shipped spyware to my device. That&#x27;s a massive breach of trust.I suspect that this time next year, I&#x27;ll still be on ios, despite my posturing. I&#x27;m certainly going to address icloud in the next few weeks - specifically, disusing it. However, I would be surprised if I&#x27;m still on ios a year or two after that.What Apple has done here isn&#x27;t horrible in the absolute sense. Instead, it&#x27;s a massive betrayal of trust with minimal immediate intrusiveness; and yet, a giant klaxon that their platform dominance in terms of privacy is coming to an end

It&#x27;s not the device that&#x27;s less secure or private in this context, it&#x27;s the services. There&#x27;s no reason you couldn&#x27;t just continue using your NAS for photo backup and Signal for encrypted-communications completely unaffected by this.Apple seems to not have interest in users devices, which makes sense -- they&#x27;re not liable for them. They _do_ seem interested in protecting the data that they house, which makes sense, because they&#x27;re liable for it and have a responsibility to remove&#x2F;report CSAM that they&#x27;re hosting.

If The Verge&#x27;s article is accurate about how&#x2F;when the CSAM scanning occurs then I don&#x27;t have a problem with that, sounds like they&#x27;re moving the scanning from server to client side, the concerns about false positives seem valid to me but I&#x27;m not sure the chance of one occurring has increased over the existing icloud scanning. Scope creep for other content scanning is definitely a possibility though so I hope people keep an eye on thatI&#x27;m not a parent but the other child protection features seem like they could definitely be abused by some parents to exert control&#x2F;pry into their kids private lives. It&#x27;s a shame that systems have to be designed to prevent abuse by bad people but at Apple&#x27;s scale it seems like they should have better answers for the concerns being raised

&gt; designate your partner as a child.That&#x27;s not how it works, unless you control your partner&#x27;s Apple ID and you lie about their DOB when you create their account.I created my kids Apple IDs when they were minors and enrolled them in Family Sharing. They are now both over 18 and I cannot just designate them as minors. Apple automatically removed my ability to control any aspects of their phones when they turned 18.&gt; Dads&#x27; photos of their kids landing them on a national kiddie porn watch list.Indeed, false positives is much more worrying. The idea that my phone is spying on my pictures... like, what the hell.

I feel like you’re sensationalizing this a lot.There’s two functions here. Both client side.First, machine learning to detect potentially inappropriate pictures for children to view. This seems to require parental controls to be on. Optionally it can send a message to the parent when a child purposefully views the image. The image itself is not shared with Apple so this is notification to parents only.The second part is a list of hashes. So the Photos app will hash images and compare to the list in the database. If it matches then presumably they do something about that. The database is only a list of KNOWN child abuse images circulating.Now, not to say I like the second part but the first one seems fine. The second is sketchy in that what happens if there’s a hash collision. But either way it seems easy enough to clear that one up.No father is going to be added to some list for their children’s photos. Stop with that hyperbole.

Moving the scanning to the client side is clearly an attempt to move towards scanning content which is about to be posted on encrypted services, otherwise they could do it on the server-side, which is &quot;not categorically unprecedented&quot;.

&gt; can be turned off by turning off iCloud back-upsUntil they push a small change to the codebase...<pre><code> @@ -7637,3 +7637,3 @@
 -if (photo.isCloudSynced &amp;&amp; scanForIllegalContent(photo)) {
 +if (scanForIllegalContent(photo)) {
 reportUserToPolice();
 }</code></pre>

Photosync can automatically move photos from iDevices into consolidated NAS, SFTP, cloud or iXpand USB storage, <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;photosync-app.com" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;photosync-app.com</a>GoodReader has optional app-level file encryption with a password that is not stored in the iOS keychain. In theory, those encrypted files should be opaque to device backups or local filesystem scanning, unless iOS or malware harvests the key from runtime memory, <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;goodreader.com&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;goodreader.com&#x2F;</a>

&gt; designate your partner as a childThis is way too much work to gain hardly anything. It&#x27;s just as easy to just log into another device with their iCloud password and literally read everything they send. Less work, more result.

The reality is that actual child abusers know who they are. They realize that society is after them. They are already paranoid, secretive, people. They are not going to be uploading pictures to the cloud of their child abuse.And let&#x27;s not forget the minor detail that this is now public knowledge. It&#x27;s like telling your teenage son you&#x27;re going to be searching his closet for marijuana in the future.

&gt; with icloud photos csam, it is also a horrifying precedentI&#x27;m not so bugged by this. Uploading data to iCloud has always been a trade of convenience at the expense of privacy. Adding a client-side filter isn&#x27;t great, but it&#x27;s not categorically unprecedented--Apple executes search warrants against iCloud data--and can be turned off by turning off iCloud back-ups.The scanning of childrens&#x27; iMessages, on the other hand, is a subversion of trust. Apple spent the last decade telling everyone their phones were secure. Creating this side channel opens up all kinds of problems. Having trouble as a controlling spouse? No problem--designate your partner as a child. Concerned your not-a-tech-whiz kid isn&#x27;t adhering to your house&#x27;s sexual mores? Solved. Bonus points if your kid&#x27;s phone outs them as LGBT. To say nothing of most sexual abuse of minors happening at the hands of someone they trust. Will their phone, when they attempt to share evidence, tattle on them to their abuser?Also, can&#x27;t wait for Dads&#x27; photos of their kids landing them on a national kiddie porn watch list.

&gt; Will they start taking pictures of your house to see if you store drugs under your couch? Or cook meth in your kitchen??How many people have homepods? When will they start listening for illegal activity?

&gt; probably good in the moral senseHow, how is it even morally good?? Will they start taking pictures of your house to see if you store drugs under your couch? Or cook meth in your kitchen??What is moral is for society to be in charge of laws and law enforcement. This vigilante behavior by private companies who answer to no one is unjust, tyrannical and just plain crazy.

&gt; While I still use google mapsI use Citymapper simply because I find it better (for the city-based journeys that are my usual call for a map app) - but it not being a Google ~data collection device~ service is no disadvantage.At least, depending why you dislike having everything locked up with Google or whoever I suppose. Personally it&#x27;s more having everything somewhere that troubles me, I&#x27;m reasonably happy with spreading things about. I like self-hosting things too, just needs a value-add I suppose, that&#x27;s not a reason in itself for me.

unfortunately, self hosting is a pretty clear alternative. Not much else seems to be.

I think self-hosting email has too many downsides (spam filtering, for example) to be worth it; I’m more concerned about losing my messages (easily solved with POP or mbox exports while still using a cloud account) than government data sharing. Email is unencrypted in transit anyway, and it’s “industry standard” to store it in clear text at each end.

there&#x27;s always protonmail which is supposedly e2e, so they shouldn&#x27;t be able to scan your mail

&gt; if your worry is governments reading your mailcomplicated. As long as they require a reasonable warrant (ha!), I&#x27;m fine. Email is an inherently insecure protocol and ecosystem, anyways.I haven&#x27;t used email for communication that I consider to be private for a while - I&#x27;ve moved most, if not all, casual conversation to signal, imessage. Soon, I hope to add something like matrix or mattermost into the mix.My goal was never to be perfect. My goal is to be able to easily remove myself from an invasive spyware ecosystem, and bring my friends along, with minimal impact.

I have been self-hosting email for 7 years successfully. But it required a physical server in a reputable datacenter, setting up Dovecot, Exim, SpamAssasin, reverse-DNS, SPF, DKIM. It took a bit of time to gain IP reputation but then it has worked flawlessly since. Occasionally some legit mail is flagged as spam or vice versa but it is not worse than any other mail provider. So it can be done! But my first attempts to do that on a VPS failed as IP blocks of VPS providers are often hopelessly blacklisted in major email providers.

I’ve been thinking about switching my main email to Fastmail from Apple, for portability in case the anti-power-user trend crosses my personal pain threshold.But if your worry is governments reading your mail, is an email company any safer? I’m sure FM doesn’t want to scan your mail for the NSA or its Australian proxy, but do they have a choice? And if they were compelled, would they not be prevented from telling you?“We respect your privacy” is exactly what Apple has been saying.

&gt; Anything &quot;think of children&quot; always has a second order affect of damaging queer people because lots of people still think of queerness as dangerous to children.For example, YouTube does this with some LGBT content. YouTube has demonitized LGBT content and placed it in restricted mode, which screens for &quot;potentially mature&quot; content[1][2].YouTube also shadowbans the content[1], preventing it from showing up in search results at all.From here[1]:&gt; Filmmaker Sal Bardo started noticing something strange: the views for his short film Sam, which tells the story of a transgender child, had started dipping. Confused, he looked at the other videos on his channel. All but one of them had been placed in restricted mode — an optional mode that screens “potentially mature” content — without YouTube informing him. In July of that year, most of them were also demonetized. One of the videos that had been restricted was a trailer for one of his short films; another was an It Gets Better video aimed at LGBTQ youth. Sam had been shadow-banned, meaning that users couldn’t search for it on YouTube. None of the videos were sexually explicit or profane.There are more examples like that here[2].[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.rollingstone.com&#x2F;culture&#x2F;culture-features&#x2F;lgbtq-youtube-lawsuit-censorship-877919&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.rollingstone.com&#x2F;culture&#x2F;culture-features&#x2F;lgbtq-...</a>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.washingtonpost.com&#x2F;technology&#x2F;2019&#x2F;08&#x2F;14&#x2F;youtube-discriminates-against-lgbt-content-by-unfairly-culling-it-suit-alleges&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.washingtonpost.com&#x2F;technology&#x2F;2019&#x2F;08&#x2F;14&#x2F;youtube...</a>

Especially since anything sexual and related to queerness is way more aggressively policed than hetero-normative counterparts.I find it intensely ironic that Apple&#x27;s CEO is openly gay.

&gt; as a queer kid, I was terrified of my parents finding outI think many queer people have a completely different idea of the concept of &quot;why do you want to hide if you&#x27;re not doing anything wrong&quot; and the desire to stay private. Especially since anything sexual and related to queerness is way more aggressively policed than hetero-normative counterparts.Anything &quot;think of children&quot; always has a second order affect of damaging queer people because lots of people still think of queerness as dangerous to children.It is beyond likely that lots of this monitoring will catch legal&#x2F;safe queer content - especially the parental-controls focused monitoring (as opposed to the gov&#x27;ment db of illegal content)

I&#x27;m really loving fastmail. Thanks for the heads up!

Interesting! But actually this is not the singly thing with an &quot;interesting&quot; name in Singapore - well at least as long as you speak Czech. ;-)You see, the mass transit company in Singapore is handled by the Singapore Municipal Rapid Transit company, abbreviated SMRT. There is also a SMRT corporation (<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;SMRT_Corporation" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;SMRT_Corporation</a>), SMRT buses, the SMRT abbreviation is heavily used on train, stations, basically everywhere.Well, in Czech &quot;smrt&quot; means literarily death. So let&#x27;s say for Czech speakers riding the public transport in Singapore can be a bit unnerving - you stand at a station platform and then a train with &quot;DEATH&quot; written on it in big letters pulls into the station. ;-)

What I am reminded of is all of the now seemingly prophetic writing and story telling in a lot of cyber-punk-dystopian anime about the future of the corporate state, and how mega corps rule EVERY THING.What I always thought was interesting was that the Police Security Services in Singapore were called &quot;CISCO&quot; -- and you used to see these swat-APV-type vans driving around and armed men with CISCO emblazened on their gear&#x2F;equip&#x2F;vehicles...I always was reminded of Cyberpunk Anime around that.

&gt; I&#x27;m not sure that I support what they are implementing for child accounts (as a queer kid, I was terrified of my parents finding out)If you don&#x27;t want your parents to look at your phone, you shouldn&#x27;t be using a phone owned by your parent&#x27;s account. The new feature doesn&#x27;t change this calculus.As a queer kid, would you enjoy being blackmailed by someone who tricked you into not telling your parents?

I&#x27;m just trying to buy time until open source and secure alternatives have addressed these problems. Apple doing this has moved my timeframes up by a few years (unexpectedly).

Signal is next on the list since it&#x27;s a centralized solution - you can expect they will come for it next.

This is typical obedient behavior. Some abused spouses get through lengths to come up with excuses for their partners. Since I don&#x27;t own an iOS device, I don&#x27;t really care about this specific instance.But I don&#x27;t want these people normalizing deep surveillance and fear that I have to get rid of my OSX devices when this trend continues.

This can happen only because whenever any slippery-slope action was taken previously, there is an army of apologists and &quot;explainers&quot; who rush to &quot;correct&quot; your instinctive aversion to these changes. It&#x27;s always the same - the initial comment is seemingly kind, yet with an underlying menace, and if you continue to express opposition, they change tack to being extremely aggressive and rude.See the comment threads around this topic, and look back to other related events (notably the tech giants censoring people &quot;for the betterment of society&quot; in the past 12 months).Boiling a frog may happen slowly, but the water continues to heat up even if we pretend it doesn&#x27;t. Very disappointed with this action by Apple.

cloud versus local device is a massive distinction imo. or maybe im a dinosaur ;)

&gt; with icloud photos csam, it is also a horrifying precedentThat precedent was set many years ago.&gt;a man [was] arrested on child pornography charges, after Google tipped off authorities about illegal images found in the Houston suspect’s Gmail account.Microsoft’s “PhotoDNA” technology is all about making it so that these specific types of illegal images can be automatically identified by computer programs, not people.PhotoDNA converts an image into a common black-and-white format and size the image to a uniform size, Microsoft explained last year while announcing its increased efforts at collaborating with Google to combat online child abuse.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;techcrunch.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;08&#x2F;06&#x2F;why-the-gmail-scan-that-led-to-a-mans-arrest-for-child-porn-was-not-a-privacy-violation&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;techcrunch.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;08&#x2F;06&#x2F;why-the-gmail-scan-that-le...</a>

Maybe Apple will decrease child abuse cases but increase cases of child suicides..

If you&#x27;re just downloading and looking at porn, no problem. It only becomes an issue if you&#x27;re sharing porn via Messages or storing it in iCloud. And to be fair, I don&#x27;t think they&#x27;re alerted to the nature of the pornography, so you might be able to avoid being outed even if you&#x27;re sharing porn (or having porn shared with you).Edit: I&#x27;m wrong in one respect: if the kid under 13 chooses to send a message with an explicit image despite being warned via notification, the image will be saved to a parental controls section. This won&#x27;t happen for children &gt;= 13.

If my parents had the feature to be alerted about porn their kid’s device while I was a teen they would have sent me to a conversion camp, and that is not an exaggeration.Apple thinks the appropriate time for queer kids to find themselves is after they turn 18.

&gt; it is also a horrifying precedent that the device I put my life into is scanning my photos and reporting on bad behaviorapples new customers are the various autocratic regimes that populate the earth. apples customers used to be human beings. there exist many profiteers in mountain view, cupertino menlo and atherton in the service of making our monopolies more capable of subjugating humanity.

It doesn&#x27;t trigger for a single match, I guess that&#x27;s the first line of defence.

how does apple protect againat hash collisions?

Fastmail is hosted in New Jersey. If it was hosted in Aus the user experience would be pretty bad for most of its users.

I also use Fastmail but being fully aware that Australia where its hosted is part of the 5 eyes spy network, and also one of the countries acting extreamly oppressive towards its citizens when it comes to covid restrictions.So I don&#x27;t actually expect my mail to be private. But at least it&#x27;s not Google.

&gt; While I still use google maps, I&#x27;ve been trialing out OSM alternatives for a minute.Is there a way to set up Android to handle shared locations without Google Maps?Every time someone shares location with me (in Telegram) it displays as a tiny picture and once I click it it says I have to install Google Maps (I use an alternative for actual maps and don&#x27;t have Google Maps installed). So I end up zooming the picture and then finding the location on the map manually.

&gt; I hope they recantThis is very much like driving a car through a crowd of protestors. They will slowly, inexorably, eventually push through.

&gt; Fortunately, my email is on a paid providerPaid doesn&#x27;t mean more secure, it&#x27;s popular mistake.

I&#x27;ve been maintaining a spare phone running lineage os exactly in case something like this happened - I love the apple watch and apple ecosystem, but this is such a flagrant abuse of their position as Maintainers Of The Device that I have no choice but to switch.Fortunately, my email is on a paid provider (fastmail), and my photos are on a NAS, I&#x27;ve worked hard to get all of my friends on Signal. While I still use google maps, I&#x27;ve been trialing out OSM alternatives for a minute.The things they&#x27;ve described are in general, reasonable and probably good in the moral sense. However, I&#x27;m not sure that I support what they are implementing for child accounts (as a queer kid, I was terrified of my parents finding out). On the surface, it seems good - but I am concerned about other snooping features that this portents.However, with icloud photos csam, it is also a horrifying precedent that the device I put my life into is scanning my photos and reporting on bad behavior (even if the initial dataset is the most reprehensible behavior).I&#x27;m saddened by Apple&#x27;s decision, and I hope they recant, because it&#x27;s the only way I will continue to use their platform.

It&#x27;s all been downhill since we heard that they stopped developing the e2e encrypted iCloud solution because it might upset the FBI even more.

Teens are also children. Apple has no business checking if they send or receive nude pics. Let alone tell their parents. This is very creepy behavior from Apple.Edit: I&#x27;m talking about this <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;pbs.twimg.com&#x2F;media&#x2F;E8DYv9hWUAksPO8?format=jpg&amp;name=large" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;pbs.twimg.com&#x2F;media&#x2F;E8DYv9hWUAksPO8?format=jpg&amp;name=...</a>

So your argument is, if you&#x27;ve done nothing wrong, you have nothing to worry about. Really? Will you feel the same when Apple later decides to include dozens more crimes that they will screen for, surreptitiously? All of which are searches without warrants or legal oversight?Let me introduce you to someone you should know better. His name is Edward Snowden. Or Louis Brandeis, who is spinning in his grave right about now.The US Fourth Amendment exists for a damned good reason.

&quot;Feels like a way to actually reach encrypted data all around while still meeting the expectations of lawmakers&#x2F;regulators&quot;And isn&#x27;t that a problem? Encrypted data should be secure, even if lawmakers don&#x27;t want math to exist.

It runs on my device and uses my CPU, battery time and my network bandwidth (to download&#x2F;upload the hashes and other necessary artifacts).I&#x27;d be fine with them scanning stuff I uploaded to them with their own computers because I don&#x27;t have any really expectation of privacy from huge corporations.

My big issue is what it opens up. As the EFF points out, it&#x27;s really not a big leap for oppressive governments to ask Apple to use the same tech (as demoed by using MS&#x27;s tech to scan for &quot;terrorist&quot; content) to remove content they don&#x27;t like from their citizens&#x27;  devices.

The point of encrypted data is not to be “reached.”

True. But, first, it also means anyone, anywhere, as long as they use iOS, is vulnerable to what the US considers to be proper. Which, I will agree, likely won’t be an issue in the case of child pornography. But there’s no way to predict how that will evolve (see Facebook’s ever expanding imposing of American cultural norms and puritanism).Next, it also means they can do it. And if it can be done for child pornography, why not terrorism? And if it can be done for the US’ definition of terrorism, why not China&#x27;s, Russia&#x27;s or Saudi Arabia&#x27;s? And if terrorism and child pornography, why not drugs consumption? Tax evasion? Social security fraud? Unknowingly talking with the wrong person?Third, there apparently is transparency on it today. But who is to say it&#x27;s possible expansion won&#x27;t be forcibly silenced in the same way Prism&#x27;s requests were?Fourth, but that&#x27;s only because I slightly am a maniac, how can anyone unilaterally decide to waste the computing power, battery life and data plan of a device I paid for without my say so? (probably one of my main gripes with ads)All in all, it means I am incorporating into my everyday life a device that can and will actively snoop on me and potentially snitch on me. Now, while I am not worried today, it definitely paves the way for many other things. And I don&#x27;t see why I should trust anyone involved to stop here or let me know when they don’t.

&gt; - It&#x27;s run _before upload to iCloud Photos_ - where it would&#x27;ve already been scanned anyway, as they&#x27;ve done for years (and as all other major companies do).Then why build this functionality at all? Why not wait until it&#x27;s uploaded and check it on their servers and not run any client side code? This is how literally every other non-encrypted cloud service operates.

&gt; considering the transparency of itWhat transparency? Apple doesn&#x27;t publish iOS source.

Since nobody would ever object to it, protecting against child abuse gets used as a wedge. As the article points out, the way this story ends is with this very backdoor getting used for other things besides preventing child abuse: anything the government asks Apple to give them. It&#x27;s an almost inevitable consequence of creating a backdoor in the first place, which is why you have to have a zero-tolerance policy against it.

&gt; Expansion of the tech would be something I&#x27;d be more concerned aboutYeah, and that’s precisely what will happen. It always starts with child porn, then they move on to “extremist content”, of which the term expands to capture more things on a daily basis. Hope you didn’t save that “sad Pepe” meme on your phone.

&gt; It&#x27;s run _before upload to iCloud Photos_ - where it would&#x27;ve already been scanned anywayRight, so ask yourself, why is it on the device? Why not just scan on the server?To me (agreeing with much of the commentary I’ve seen) the likeliest answer is that they are confining the scan to pre uploads now not for any technical reason but to make the rollout palatable to the public. Then they’re one update away from quietly changing the rules. There’s absolutely no reason to do the scan on your private device if they plan to only confine this to stuff they could scan away from your device.

As many, many people have pointed out, building a mechanism to scan things client-side is something which could easily be extended to encrypted content, and perhaps, is intended to be extended at a moment&#x27;s notice to encrypted content, if they see an opportunity to do so.It&#x27;s like having hundreds of nukes ready for launch, as opposed to having the first launch being a year away.If they wanted to &quot;do it as all major companies do&quot;, then they could have done it on the server-side, and there wouldn&#x27;t have been a debate about it at all, although it is still extremely questionable, as far as privacy is concerned.

Now it will be &quot;before upload&quot;. In 1-2 years it&#x27;s &quot;scan all local photos&quot; in the name of &quot;make the World a better place&quot;. It&#x27;s such a small technical step for Apple to change this scanning behaviour in the future and scan even offline photos. All the necessary software is on all Apple i-devices already by then.Everybody is a potential criminal with photos on your phone unless you prove otherwise by scanning. This is the future we are heading to. To do the scanning on device is actually the weakest point of their implementation IMHO.

This seems even worse.  If the images are only scanned before upload to iCloud then Apple has opened a backdoor that doesn’t even give them any new capability.  If I am understanding this right an iPhone can still be used to distribute CSAM as long as the user is logged out of iCloud?  So it’s an overreach and ineffective?

There are always scenarios that one cannot catch. EFF highlights one such.It sounds like it could be quite common. And it could be an absolute nightmare scenario for the kid who does not have the feature turned on.This means that if—for instance—a minor using an iPhone without these features turned on sends a photo to another minor who does have the features enabled, they do not receive a notification that iMessage considers their image to be “explicit” or that the recipient’s parent will be notified. The recipient’s parents will be informed of the content without the sender consenting to their involvement. Additionally, once sent or received, the “sexually explicit image” cannot be deleted from the under-13 user’s device.

I think the EFF is probably doing good by calling attention to the issue, but let&#x27;s... actually look at the feature before passing judgement, e.g:<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;josephfcox&#x2F;status&#x2F;1423382200880439298&#x2F;photo&#x2F;1" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;josephfcox&#x2F;status&#x2F;1423382200880439298&#x2F;ph...</a>- It&#x27;s run for Messages in cases where a child is potentially viewing material that&#x27;s bad.- It&#x27;s run _before upload to iCloud Photos_ - where it would&#x27;ve already been scanned anyway, as they&#x27;ve done for years (and as all other major companies do).To me this really doesn&#x27;t seem that bad. Feels like a way to actually reach encrypted data all around while still meeting the expectations of lawmakers&#x2F;regulators. Expansion of the tech would be something I&#x27;d be more concerned about, but considering the transparency of it I feel like there&#x27;s some safety.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;</a> more info here as well.

I&#x27;ve always been convinced that Apple cared about privacy as a way of competitive advantage. I don&#x27;t need them to be committed morally or ethically, I just need them to be serious about it because I will give them my money if they are.

I’d say you’re spot on, but I can’t say why.

What competitive advantage does performing semantic hashing of my photos for law enforcement give apple

The cynical take is that Apple was never committed to privacy in and of itself, but they are commited to privacy as long as it improves their competitive advantage, whether by marketing or by making sure that only Apple can extract value from its customers&#x27; data.Hanlon&#x27;s razor does not apply to megacorporations that have enormous piles of cash and employ a large number of very smart people, who are either entirely unscrupulous or for whom scruples are worth less than their salaries. We probably aren&#x27;t cynical enough.I am not arguing that we should always assume every change is always malicious towards users. But our index of suspicion should be high.

It is secure, as long as you have nothing to hide. If you have no offending photos, then the data won&#x27;t be uploaded! See, it&#x27;s not nefarious at all! &#x2F;s

&gt; because the CEO seemed to be sincere in his commitment to privacy.The sincerity of a company officer, even the CEO, should not factor into your assessment. Officers change over time (and individuals can change their stance over time), after all.

Except the hashing and hash comparison are happening on the device itself.

Yet Apple gave access to all the chinese user iCloud data to the Chinese government, including messages, emails, pictures, etc.NYT Daily had an episode where they talked about how the CCP is getting Apple to bend it&#x27;s commitment to privacy:<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nytimes.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;06&#x2F;14&#x2F;podcasts&#x2F;the-daily&#x2F;apple-china-privacy.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nytimes.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;06&#x2F;14&#x2F;podcasts&#x2F;the-daily&#x2F;apple-...</a>

Last I heard on HN was that it was scrapped entirely as a consequence of some event I don’t remember. I hope someone has a better memory than I do.

I’m still waiting on iCloud backup encryption they promised a while back. There were reports that they scrapped those plans because the FBI told them to, but nothing official announced since 2019 on this.

As soon as Cook became CEO, he let the NSA&#x27;s Prism program into Apple. Everything since then has been a fucking lie.&gt; Andrew Stone, who worked with Jobs for nearly 25 years, told the site Cult of Mac last week that Steve Jobs resisted letting Apple be part of PRISM, a surveillance program that gives the NSA access to records of major Internet companies. His comments come amid speculation that Jobs resisted cooperating. “Steve Jobs would’ve rather died than give into that,” Stone told the site.&gt; According to leaked NSA slides about PRISM, Apple was the last tech behemoth to join the secret program — in October 2012, a year after Jobs died. Apple has said that it first heard about PRISM on June 6 of this year, when asked about it by reporters.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.huffpost.com&#x2F;entry&#x2F;apple-nsa-steve-jobs_n_3461323" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.huffpost.com&#x2F;entry&#x2F;apple-nsa-steve-jobs_n_346132...</a>I mean, maybe they didn&#x27;t call it &quot;PRISM&quot; when talking about it with Cook, so it could technically be true that they didn&#x27;t hear of PRISM until media stories. Everyone knows the spy agency goes around telling all of their project code names to companies they&#x27;re trying to compromise. Hello, sir. We&#x27;re here to talk to you about our top secret surveillance program we like to call PRISM where we intercept and store communications of everyone. Would you like to join? MS did. So did Google. Don&#x27;t you want to be in our select cool club?

Do you have any references for your remarks on the current situation where all iCloud photos are scanned on the server side?

nah. this is not how trust works. if Apple does stuff like this, I stop trusting Apple. Binary. Trust of No Trust.Who is to say once they start doing this they will not extend their capabilities and monitor everything on the device? This is the direction we’re heading in.For me this is my last iphone. And probably my last mac. the hardware is nice, shiny ams usable but you cannot do shit like this after you sell everyone on privacy.What would a company that cares about privacy do? you don’t scan any of my things without explaining why and getting my consent. That’s privacy

what happens when a government legally forces them to look for politically dissident content? they have already lost this fight, it is an inevitability

Not really. This only applies to photos uploaded to iCloud. And photos uploaded to iCloud (and Google drive etc.) are already scanned on server for CP.Apple is moving that process from on server to on phone in a way that protects your privacy better than current standards.In the current system, all your photos are available to Apple unencrypted. In the new system, nothing will be visible to apple unless you upload N images with database hits. From those N tokens, Apple is then able to decrypt your content.So when this feature lands, it improves your privacy relative to today.

Don&#x27;t worry - you can trust ALL of these guys:<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;i.imgur.com&#x2F;z3JeRgk.jpg" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;i.imgur.com&#x2F;z3JeRgk.jpg</a>

Tim Cook doesn&#x27;t Lie. I think he convinced himself what he said wasn&#x27;t lying. That Apple and himself are so righteous. Which is actually worst, because that mentality filters through from Top to Bottom. And it is showing in their marketing and PR messages. He is also doing exactly Steve Jobs&#x27;s last advice to him, Do the right thing. Except &quot;the right thing&quot; is so ambiguous it may turn out to be one of the worst advice.My biggest turning point was Tim Cook flat out lying on the Apple case against Qualcomm. Double Dipping? Qualcomm patents being more than double than all the other six combined? And the tactics they used in court which was vastly different to Apple vs Samsung&#x27;s case. And yes, they lost. ( Or settled )That is the same with privacy. They simplifies their PR message as tracking = evil. Tracking is invading your privacy. Which is all good. But at the same time Apple is tracking you, everything you do on Apple Music, Apple TV+, App Store and even Apple Card. ( They only promise not to sell your Data to third party, they still have some of those Data. ). What that means is that only Apple is allowed to track you, but anyone else doing it are against privacy? What Apple really meant by the word Privacy then is that Data should not be sold to third parties. But no, they intentionally keep it unclear and created a war on Data Collection while they are doing it. And you now have people flat out claiming Apple doesn&#x27;t collect any Data.Then there is a war on Ads. Which was so bad the Ad industry pushes back and Tim Cook had to issue a mild statement saying they are not against Ads, only targeted Ads. What?Once you start questioning all of his motives, and find concrete evidence that he is lying, along with all the facts from court case of how Apple has long term plans to destroy other companies, they all line up and shape how you view Tim Cook&#x27;s Apple. And it isn&#x27;t pretty.And that is speaking from an Apple fan for longer than two decade.

If that&#x27;s your bar for labeling someone a big liar, I surely don&#x27;t wanna know ya.I actually use this feature pretty regularly in Safari, even if it&#x27;s a long press rather than force touch now.

There was a funny, tiny thing that happened a few years back that made me think Tim Cook is a liar.It was back when Apple had just introduced the (now-abandoned) Force Touch feature (i.e., pressure sensitive touch, since abandoned, since it turns out pushing hard on an unyielding surface is not very pleasant or useful).To showcase the capability, Apple had updated many of its apps with new force-touch features. One of which was mail: if you pushed just right on the subject line of a message, you&#x27;d get a tiny, unscrollable popout preview of its contents.It was totally useless: it took just as much time to force touch to see the preview as just normally tapping to view the message, and the results were less useful. It was also fairly fiddly: if you didn&#x27;t press hard enough, you didn&#x27;t get the preview; if you pressed too hard, it would open into the full email anyway.So Tim Cook, demoing the feature, said a funny thing. He said, &quot;It&#x27;s great, I use it all the time.&quot;Which maybe, just maybe, is true, but personally I don&#x27;t believe, not for a second.So since then, I&#x27;ve had Tim down in my book as basically a big liar.

What I want to know is why they decided to implement this. Are Apple just trying to appear virtuous and took action independently? Or was this done at someone else&#x27;s request?For all the rhetoric about privacy coming from Apple, I feel that such an extreme measure would surely cause complaints from anyone deeply invested in privacy. And maybe they&#x27;re just using words like &quot;significant privacy benefits compared to previous techniques&quot; to make it sound reasonable to the average user who&#x27;s not that invested in privacy.

This year I purchased my first iPhone since the 3G, after today I am starting to regret that decision. At this point, I can only hope Linux on mobile picks up steam.

So you mean the company that was part of PRISM, that has unfair business practices and a bully as a founder was not really the world savior their marketting speach said they were ?I&#x27;m in shock. Multi-billion dollars company usually never lies to make money! And power grabbing entities have such a neat track record in human history.Not to mention nobody saw that coming and told repeatadly one should not get locked into such a closed and proprietary ecosystem in the first place.I mean, dang, this serial killer was such a nice guy. The dead babies in the basements were weird but appart from that he was a stellar neighbour.

I remember an Apple conference where Tim Cook personally assured us that Apple is fully committed to privacy, that everything is so secure because the iPhone is so powerful that all necessary calculations can happen on the device itself, and that we are &quot;not the product&quot;. I think the Apple CEO said some of this in the specific context of speech processing, yet it seemed a specific case of a general principle upheld by Apple.I bought an iPhone because the CEO seemed to be sincere in his commitment to privacy.What Apple has announced here seems to be a complete reversal from what I understood the CEO saying at the conference only a few years ago.

Thanks! Macroexpanded:Expanded Protections for Children - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28078115" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28078115</a> - Aug 2021 (291 comments)Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28075021" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28075021</a> - Aug 2021 (349 comments)Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741</a> - Aug 2021 (680 comments)

Recent relevant discussion.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741</a><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28075021" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28075021</a><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28078115" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28078115</a>

I think the issue is that what the tech community sees as privacy is different than what the general public thinks of as privacy.Apple, very astutely, understands that difference and exploited the latter to differentiate its phones from its main competitor: cheap(er) android phones.Apple didn’t want the phones to be commoditized, like personal computers before it. And “privacy” is something that you can’t commoditize. Once you own that association, it is hard to fight against it.Apple also understands that the general public will support its anti child exploitation and the public will not see this as a violation of privacy.

Both the US government and Chinese government can get whatever they want from both iCloud and IMessage. Best not to use it for anything that could make you a target of theirs.

&gt; Think of it this way: If you want to hide from companies, choose Apple. If you want to hide from the US Government, choose open source.It&#x27;s not just the US government: they&#x27;ve been cooperating with the PRC government as well (e.g. iCloud in China runs on servers owned by a state-owned company, and apparently China rejected the HSM Apple was using elsewhere, so they designed one specifically for China). Apple has some deniability there, but I personally wouldn&#x27;t be surprised if China could get any data from them that it wanted.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nytimes.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;05&#x2F;17&#x2F;technology&#x2F;apple-china-censorship-data.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.nytimes.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;05&#x2F;17&#x2F;technology&#x2F;apple-china-ce...</a>

The US has a rather weak central government. The Chinese-style social credit system isn&#x27;t necessary, because private corporations already do it. Scanning your ID when you return things, advertising profiles, etc.

The problem is that as governments gain access to new technological capabilities and exploit crises to acquire more emergency powers, increasingly large numbers of peoples’ threat models begin to include government.The best hopes against a population-wide Chinese-style social credit system being implemented in the US remain constitutional and cultural, but the more architectural help we get from technology the better. “Code is law” is still a valid observation.

Apple&#x27;s battle is against Surveillance Capitalism, not against state-level surveillance. In fact, there is no publicly traded company that is against state-level surveillance. It&#x27;s important not to confuse the two.Think of it this way: If you want to hide from companies, choose Apple. If you want to hide from the US Government, choose open source.But if your threat model really does include the US government or some other similarly capable adversary, you are well and truly fucked already. The state-level apparatus for spying on folks through metadata and traffic interception is now mode than a decade old.

It&#x27;s the RDF. People still think of Apple as the Old Apple. The rebellious company that stood for creative freedom. The maker of tools that work for the user, not against the user.

I keep thinking, It&#x27;s like they are trying to be the most ironic company in history...But then I have to remind myself, the old Apple is long gone, the new Apple is a completely different beast, with a very different concept of what it is marketing.

If you read the article, you&#x27;d understand that among ALL the issues, this is not one:- Photos scanning in Messages is on-device only (no reporting to govt.) and doesn&#x27;t turn on unless you&#x27;re an adult who turns it on for a minor via Family Sharing controls.
- iCloud Photos scanning doesn&#x27;t take effect unless you save the photo and it&#x27;s already in a database of flagged photos. So in your scenario, you&#x27;d have to save the photo received from the unknown number to get flagged.

&gt;don’t use iMessage1. Send someone you hate a message with cartoon making fun of tyrant-president.2. That person is now on a list.Its swatting-as-a-service.

I’m fairly certain the age is different per region and hopefully tied to the age of consent (in this particular case).

Would artificially inflating every child’s age to 18+ eliminate the iMessage problem

Ha ha. They have a fully functional spying software installed on the phone and the government will stop at these restrictions?

&gt; As far as this is concerned, seems like if you don’t use iMessage or iCloud you’re safe for now.Yes, this is correct. The Messages feature only applies to children under 18 who are in an iCloud Family, and the photo library feature only applies if you are using iCloud Photos.

Unless the entire stack you’re using is audited and open source this sort of thing is inevitable.As far as this is concerned, seems like if you don’t use iMessage or iCloud you’re safe for now.

The database contains perceptual hashes, not images.

No, they will host the hashes computed from those images.

Yes, everyone in jail! It’s probably just the md5 or something like that, but I don’t like it either.

And how did the user end up with the hashes? He hashed the original images which he then deleted, your honor!BTW this is going to be a major target for smearing people that the US doens&#x27;t like

&gt; So every iPhone will now host the explicit images from the National Center for Missing &amp; Exploited Children database.It&#x27;s hashes, not the images themselves.

I&#x27;m pretty sure this is a non-tech way of saying &quot;a machine learning model&quot; or other parameters which is not a particularly useful form of this database.

&gt; No user receives any CSAM photo, not even in encrypted form. Users receive a data structure of blinded fingerprints of photos in the CSAM database. Users cannot recover these fingerprints and therefore cannot use them to identify which photos are in the CSAM database.Source (PDF): <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;Technical_Assessment_of_CSAM_Detection_Benny_Pinkas.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;Technical_Assessment_...</a>

For what purpose? A collision doesn&#x27;t mean that you found the source images. Not even close.

There is a minimum number of hash matches required, then images are made available to Apple who then manually checks that they are CSAM material and not just collisions. That&#x27;s what the 9to5Mac story about this says: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;9to5mac.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;08&#x2F;05&#x2F;apple-announces-new-protections-for-child-safety-imessage-safety-icloud-photo-scanning-more&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;9to5mac.com&#x2F;2021&#x2F;08&#x2F;05&#x2F;apple-announces-new-protectio...</a>

How long until a hacker uses ML to generate collisions against those hashes?

“This means that when the features are rolled out, a version of the NCMEC CSAM database will be uploaded onto every single iPhone.”So every iPhone will now host the explicit images from the National Center for Missing &amp; Exploited Children database.

(2) is important. Apple put effort into making this at least somewhat privacy-respecting, while the other players just scan everything with no limit at all. They also scan everything for any purpose including marketing, political profiling, etc.Apple remains the most privacy respecting major vendor. The only way to do better is fully open software and open hardware.

It&#x27;s not doing any sort of scanning of your photos while they&#x27;re just sitting on your device. The CSAM scanning only occurs when uploading photos to iCloud, and only to the photos being uploaded.Source (pdf): <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;CSAM_Detection_Techni...</a>

&gt; There is a potential for abuse of this system, but consider the following too&gt; I think again, the backlash is daft.Don&#x27;t apologize for this bullshit! Don&#x27;t let your love of brand trump the reality of what&#x27;s going on here.Machinery is being put in place to detect what files are on your supposedly secure device. Someone has the reins and promises not to use it for anything other than &quot;protecting the children&quot;.How many election cycles or generations does it take to change to an unfavorable climate where this is now a tool of great asymmetrical power to use against the public?What happens when the powers that be see that you downloaded labor union materials, documents from Wikileaks, or other files that implicate you as a risk?Perhaps a content hash on your phone puts you in a flagged bucket where you get pat downs at the airport, increased surveillance, etc.The only position to take here is a full rebuke of Apple.edit: Apple apologists are taking a downright scary position now. I suppose the company has taken a full 180 from their 1984 ad centerpiece. But that&#x27;s okay, right, because Apple is a part of your identity and it&#x27;s beyond reproach?edit 2: It&#x27;s nominally iCloud only (a key feature of the device&#x2F;ecosystem), but that means having to turn off a lot of settings. One foot in the door...edit 3: Please don&#x27;t be complicit in allowing this to happen. Don&#x27;t apologize or rationalize. This is only a first step. We warned that adtech and monitoring and abuse of open source were coming for years, and we were right. We&#x27;re telling you - loudly - that this will begin a trend of further erosion of privacy and liberty.

Who verifies CSAM databases? Is there a way to verify the CSAM hashlist hasn&#x27;t been tampered with and additional hashes inserted?Would it be ok to use this approach to stop &quot;terrorism&quot;? Are you ok with both Biden and Trump defining that list?

&gt; Who audits these databases? Where is the oversight to guarantee only appropriate content is included? They are famously opaque because the very viewing of the content is illegal. So how can we know that they contain what they are purported to contain?I wholeheartedly agree: there is an audit question here too. The contents of the database are by far the most dangerous part of this equation, malicious or not, targeted or not. I don&#x27;t like the privacy implications about this, nor the potential for abuse. I would love to see some kind of way to audit the database, or ensure that it&#x27;s only used &quot;for good.&quot; I just don&#x27;t know what that system is, and I know that PhotoDNA is already in use on other cloud providers.Matthew Green&#x27;s ongoing analysis [0] is really worth keeping an eye on. For example, there&#x27;s a good question: can you just scan against a different database for different people? These are the right questions given what we have right now.[0]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;matthew_d_green&#x2F;status&#x2F;1423378285468209153" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;matthew_d_green&#x2F;status&#x2F;14233782854682091...</a>

That’s a problem with NCMEC, not Apple’s proposal today. Furthermore, if it were an actual problem, it would’ve already manifested with the numerous current users of PhotoDNA which includes Facebook and Google. I don’t think the database of known CSAM content includes photos that cannot be visually recognized as child abuse.

&quot;Reports from commenters&quot; = unsubstantiated speculation. Weird how no one was able to specifically state any information about these unobjectionable photos except for a theoretical mechanism for them to find their way into the database.

&gt;&gt; Who audits these databases?Maybe pedophiles working for those companies.

&gt; that a tool designed to stop the spread of CSAM is a &quot;bad thing&quot;It&#x27;s certainly said to be designed to do it, but have you seen concerns raised in the other thread (<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=28068741</a>)? There have been reports from some commenters of the NCMEC database containing unobjectionable photos because they were merely found in a context alongside some CSAM.Who audits these databases? Where is the oversight to guarantee only appropriate content is included? They are famously opaque because the very viewing of the content is illegal. So how can we know that they contain what they are purported to contain?This is overreach.

1. was new to me.TIL - (2014) PhotoDNA Lets Google, FB and Others Hunt Down Child Pornography Without Looking at Your Photos<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;petapixel.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;08&#x2F;08&#x2F;photodna-lets-google-facebook-others-hunt-down-child-pornography-without-looking-at-your-photos&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;petapixel.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;08&#x2F;08&#x2F;photodna-lets-google-facebo...</a>

Then you have two choices, disable iCloud photo backups or don’t upgrade to iOS 15. There are plenty of arguments against Apple’s scheme, but this isn’t one of them.

Photos is just an app.You can use another photo app, link it to another cloud provider, and be free of the burden.If you use Photos, you&#x27;re along for the ride, and you&#x27;ve consented to whatever it does.You don&#x27;t get a line-item veto on code you choose to run, that&#x27;s never been how it works.For what it&#x27;s worth, I&#x27;m basically with the EFF on this: it looks like the thin end of a wedge, it sucks and I&#x27;m not happy about it.But being histrionic doesn&#x27;t help anything.

You chose an apple device because apple knows what&#x27;s best for you.This is part of the integrated experience

This is an abuse my property rights. The device is my property and this activity will be using my CPU, battery time and my network bandwidth. That&#x27;s the abuse right there.They should just use their own computers to do this stuff.

&gt; backlash is daftFighting to preserve a freedom is not daft, even if it is David vs. Goliath&#x27;s bigger, meaner brother and his friends.

Well, it’d be kind of dumb to make the mistake of building a system to stop child pornography only to have it become the biggest distributor of CP photos in history

&gt; recruited mathematicians to analyze it, and published the results, as well as one in-house proof and one independent proof showing the cryptographic integrity of the system.Apple employs cryptographers, but they are not necessarily acting in your interest. Case in point: their use of private set intersection, to preserve privacy..of law enforcement, not users. Their less technical summary:&gt; Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching using a database of known CSAM image hashes provided by NCMEC and other child safety organizations. Apple further transforms this database into an unreadable set of hashes that is securely stored on users’ devices.&gt; Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the known CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic technology called private set intersection..The matching is performed on device, so the user’s privacy isn’t at stake. But, thanks to PSI and the hash preprocessing, the user doesn’t know what law enforcement is looking for.

I’d be interested to see what any Apple executives would respond to the concerns in interviews, but I don’t expect Apple to issue a press release on the concerns.

What is the point of E2EE vs TLS&#x2F;SSL based encryption?

You presume Apple and the DoJ will implement this with human beings at each step. They won&#x27;t. Both parties will automate as much of this clandestine search as possible. With time, the external visibility and oversight of this practice will fade, and with it, any motivation to confirm fair and accurate matches. Welcome to the sloppiness inherent in clandestine law enforcement intel gathering.As with all politically-motivated initiatives that boldly violate the Constitution (consider the FISA Court, and its rubber stamp approval of 100% of the secret warrants put before it), the use and abuse of this system will go largely underground, like FISA, and its utility will slowly degrade due to lack of oversight. In time, even bad matches will log the IDs of both parties in databases that label them as potential sexual predators.Believe it. That&#x27;s how modern computer-based gov&#x27;t intel works. Like most law enforcement policy recommendation systems, Apple&#x27;s initial match algorithm will never be assessed for accuracy, nor be accountable for being wrong at least 10% of the time. In time it will be replaced by other third party screening software that will be even more poorly written and overseen. That&#x27;s just what law enforcement does.I&#x27;ve personally seen people suffer this kind of gov&#x27;t abuse and neglect as a result of clueless automated law enforcement initiatives after 9-1-1. I don&#x27;t welcome more, nor the gradual and willful tossing of everyone&#x27;s basic Constitutional rights that Apple&#x27;s practice portends.The damages to personal liberty that are inherent in conducting secret searches without cause or oversight is exactly why the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant before conducting a search. NOW is the time to disabuse your sense of &#x27;daftness&#x27;; not years from now, after the Fourth and Fifth Amendments become irreversibly passe. Or should I say, &#x27;daft&#x27;?

I really love the EFF, but I also believe the immediate backlash is (relatively) daft. There is a potential for abuse of this system, but consider the following too:1. PhotoDNA is already scanning content from Google Photos and a whole host of other service providers.2. Apple is obviously under pressure to follow suit, but they developed an on-device system, recruited mathematicians to analyze it, and published the results, as well as one in-house proof and one independent proof showing the cryptographic integrity of the system.3. Nobody, and I mean nobody, is going to successfully convince the general public that a tool designed to stop the spread of CSAM is a &quot;bad thing&quot; unless they can show concrete examples of the abuse.For one and two: given the two options, would you rather that Apple implement serverside scanning, in the clear, or go with the on-device route? If we assume a law was passed to require serverside scanning (which could very well happen), what would that do to privacy?For three: It&#x27;s an extremely common trope to say that people do things to &quot;save the children.&quot; Well, that&#x27;s still true. Arguing against a CSAM scanning tool, which is technically more privacy preserving than alternatives from other cloud providers, is an extremely uphill battle. The biggest claim here is that the detection tool could be abused against people. And that very well may be possible! But the whole existence of NCMEC is predicated on stopping the active and real danger of child sex exploitation. We know with certainty this is a problem. Compared to a certainty of child sex abuse, the hypothetical risk from such a system is practically laughable to most people.So, I think again, the backlash is daft. It&#x27;s been about two days of the announcement being public (leaks). The underlying mathematics behind the system has barely been published [0]. It looks like the EFF rushed to make a statement here, and in doing so, it doesn&#x27;t look like they took the time to analyze the cryptography system, to consider the attacks against it, or to consider possible motivations and outcomes. Maybe they did, and they had advanced access to the material. But it doesn&#x27;t look like it, and in the court of public opinion, optics are everything.[0]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;Alternative_Security_Proof_of_Apple_PSI_System_Mihir_Bellare.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;child-safety&#x2F;pdf&#x2F;Alternative_Security_...</a>

I&#x27;d go a step further and recommend <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;grapheneos.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;grapheneos.org&#x2F;</a> with a Pixel phone.

There are tons of devices compatible with LineageOS. I suggest taking a look there. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lineageos.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lineageos.org&#x2F;</a>

I was so excited after reading the specs but damn $899 is a lot.

The Librem 5¹ is both more powerful then the PinePhone, and is slated² to get RYF certification³ from the FSF.1. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;puri.sm&#x2F;products&#x2F;librem-5&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;puri.sm&#x2F;products&#x2F;librem-5&#x2F;</a>2. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;puri.sm&#x2F;posts&#x2F;librem-5-update-shipping-estimates-and-cpu-supply-chain&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;puri.sm&#x2F;posts&#x2F;librem-5-update-shipping-estimates-and...</a>3. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ryf.fsf.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ryf.fsf.org&#x2F;</a>

I wish there was a privacytools.io for hardware. I&#x27;ve been an iPhone user since the beginning but now I&#x27;m interested in alternatives. Last I checked, PinePhone was still being actively developed. Are there any decent phones that strike a balance between privacy and usability?

The die was cast with the 2020 elections when Apple decided get into the fray. Much of tech also got into the fray. Once they openly decided to use their power, they couldn’t get back out.

And if you don’t believe me, ask yourself who holds the keys to iCloud data for both foreign and domestic customers. Ask Apple if it has ever provided data for a foreign customer to the US government. What do you think GDPR is for?Hint: it isn’t end to end encrypted, Apple doesn’t need your password to read the information, and you will never knowWho the frack would design a system that way and why?

Apple is part of the power structure of the US. That means that it has a hand in shaping the agenda for the US but with that power comes the responsibility to carry out the agenda.This also means that it is shielded from attack by the power structure. That is the bargain that the tech industry has struck.The agenda is always towards increasing power for the power structure. One form of power is information. That means that Apple is inexorably drawn towards increasing surveillance. Also, Apple’s massive customer base both domestic and overseas is a juicy surveillance target.

None of the announcements describe an iMessage back door, even if you’re being extremely generous about what back door means.

How so? That&#x27;s literally what it is.

This is an excellent example of how far off the rails the EFF has gone. This is completely false:&gt; &quot;Apple is planning to build a backdoor into its data storage system and its messaging system&quot;

You link to an article that says ... &quot;Overall, the evidence suggests that CCTV c  an reduce crime.&quot;. And then continues mention that specific context matters: Vehicle crime ... oh well, I wonder if we could combat that without surveilance, like better locks, remote disable of the engine ... There as here with the phones, society has to evaluate the price of the loss of privacy and abuse by totalitarien systems, which will happen - we just can&#x27;t say when. This is why some - like me - resist backdoors at all if for the price of &quot;more crime&quot;.

Studies have shown that CCTV reduces crime (<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;whatworks.college.police.uk&#x2F;toolkit&#x2F;Pages&#x2F;Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=1" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;whatworks.college.police.uk&#x2F;toolkit&#x2F;Pages&#x2F;Interventi...</a>). I expect results here will be even better.This technology uses secret sharing to ensure a threshold of images are met before photos are flagged. In this case, it&#x27;s even more private than CCTV.Totalitarian regimes to do not need some magic bit of technology to abuse citizens; that&#x27;s been clear since the dawn of time. Those who are concerned about abuse would do well to direct their efforts towards maintenance of democratic systems: upholding societal, political, regulatory and legal checks and balances.Criminals are becoming better criminals by taking advantage of advancements in technology right now, and, for better or worse, it&#x27;s an arms race and society will simply not accept criminals gaining the upper hand.If not proven necessary, society is capable of reverting to prior standards (Habeas Corpus resumed after the Civil War, and parts of the Patriot Act have expired, for example.).

oh that&#x27;s actually kind of good news then. I couldn&#x27;t believe Apple wouldn&#x27;t know about the inadequacy of their PC

You confused the 2 new features. The child pornography detector compares perceptual hashes. The iMessage filter tries to classify sexually explicit images.

Could you explain please - can these hash comparisons be extended to other areas such as contextual analysis of photos or texts?For example would it be easy now to get to the hypothetical scenario where texts containing certain phrases will be flagged if some partner &#x2F; regulator demands that?Or doing face recognition on images, etc.? Or is this still completely different from that

Good news! It&#x27;s not doing contextual analysis of content. It&#x27;s comparing image hashes.

Apple&#x27;s parental controls are HORRIBLE. There is at least 20% false positives there, that flag all sorts of absolutely benign sites as &quot;adult&quot;.Any kind of machine-based contextual analysis of users&#x27; content will be a disaster.

First they built a walled garden beautiful on the inside and excoriated competitors [1] for their lack of privacy. Now that the frogs have walked into the walled garden, they have started to boil the pot [2] . I don’t think the frogs will ever find out when to get off the pot.[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;the-goods&#x2F;2019&#x2F;6&#x2F;4&#x2F;18652228&#x2F;apple-sign-in-feature-facebook-google-privacy" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;the-goods&#x2F;2019&#x2F;6&#x2F;4&#x2F;18652228&#x2F;apple-sign-i...</a>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Boiling_frog" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Boiling_frog</a>

You’re obliged to report that image to the police. These types of images are contraband.

&gt; they are sending known photos of child exploitation to a minorHow do you know its a known photo of child exploitation? The original image that was hashed and then deleted. Two completely different images have the same hash.WhatsApp automatically saves images to photos. What if you receive a bad image and are reported due to someone else sending the image to you?

No, I’m not. You’re confusing the issues. If you have a child’s account, joined to your family group, you will get alerted about explicit images — if you decide to use it.The photos that you are obliged to report are child pornography that match a hash in a database used everywhere. If you don’t report, you’re in a place where you may have criminal liability.

You’ve got it mixed up. The messages are scanned for any explicit material (which in many but not all cases is illegal), not specific hash matches. That’s only for uploads to iCloud Photos.Additionally, you are not “obliged” to report such photos to the police. Uninvolved service providers do have to submit some sort of report iirc, but to require regular users to do so would raise Fifth Amendment concerns.

This article is irresponsible hand-waving.“ When Apple releases these “client-side scanning” functionalities, users of iCloud Photos, child users of iMessage, and anyone who talks to a minor through iMessage will have to carefully consider their privacy and security priorities in light of the changes, and possibly be unable to safely use what until this development is one of the preeminent encrypted messengers.”People sending messages to minors that trigger a hash match have more fundamental things to consider, as they are sending known photos of child exploitation to a minor.The EFF writer knows this, as they describe the feature in the article. They should be ashamed of publishing this crap.

Is anyone even using Apple if they care about privacy and security?

Luckily I only use phone to make phone calls, offline GPS and to control some gizmos like drones. Do not even have data plan. Not an Apple customer either so I guess my exposure to things mentioned is more limited.

&gt; these notifications give the sense that Apple is watching over the user’s shoulder—and in the case of under-13s, that’s essentially what Apple has given parents the ability to do.Well, yes? Parents are already legally responsible for their young children and under their supervision. The alternative would be to not even give such young children these kind of devices to begin with - which might actually be preferable.&gt; this system will give parents who do not have the best interests of their children in mind one more way to monitor and control themTrue. But the ability to send or receive explicit images would most likely not be the biggest issue they would be facing.I understand the slippery slope argument the EFF is making, but they should keep to the government angle. Having the ability for governments to deploy specific machine learning classifiers is not a good thing.

Definitely that&#x27;s why they use the most vulnerable subject. I can&#x27;t think of anything more sensitive than this. Every parent would be okay with this.

I doubt this will be as clean. A large swath of people will defend this &quot;for the children&quot;.

Apple employees successfully pressured their employer to fire a new hire and are petitioning to keep WFH.<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;recode&#x2F;2021&#x2F;5&#x2F;13&#x2F;22435266&#x2F;apple-employees-petition-controversial-antonio-garcia-martinez-new-hire-departure" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;recode&#x2F;2021&#x2F;5&#x2F;13&#x2F;22435266&#x2F;apple-employee...</a><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;recode&#x2F;22583549&#x2F;apple-employees-petition-work-home-employee-activism" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.vox.com&#x2F;recode&#x2F;22583549&#x2F;apple-employees-petition...</a>Will they apply that energy and leverage to push back on this?How else can this be stopped before it goes too far? Telling people to &quot;Drop Apple&quot; is even less effective than &quot;Delete Facebook&quot;.

Presumably by adding signatures for &quot;populist&#x2F;nationalist right&quot; memes.

This is going to be used to suppress political dissidents aka &quot;populist&#x2F;nationalist right&quot; aka the new alqaedasearching for CP is the original pretext

But the claim is that Apple does that &quot;on device&quot;. To the best of my understanding, this would mean that both parties in the PSI protocol are &quot;on the same device&quot;. Do they probably use some kind of TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) to evaluate the &quot;other side&quot; of the PSI protocol?

&gt;how come that &quot;the device will not know whether a match has been found&quot;Probably using some sort of probabilistic query like a bloom filter.

Technically speaking, if Apple plans to perform PSI on device (as opposed to what Microsoft does), how come that &quot;the device will not know whether a match has been found&quot;?Is there anyone who&#x27;s familiar with the technology so they can explain how it works?

Yes, if you act as the police you are a vigilante.

Yes. I&#x27;m not interested in catching pedophiles, or drug dealers, or terrorists. It&#x27;s the job of the police. I&#x27;m not the police.

There isn&#x27;t any reason to believe the CSAM hash list is only images. The government now has the ability to search for anything in your iCloud account with this.

I invite you to look up &quot;The Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse&quot;. Child Pornography is but one of the well trodden paths to remove privacy and security.

&quot;CSAM&quot; is an easy target because people can&#x27;t see it - it would be wrong for you to audit the db because then you&#x27;d need the illicit content. So its invisible to the average law-abiders.

France has been pushing terrorism as a justification for mass-surveillance in the E.U.

Why is it always &quot;think of the children&quot;? It gets people emotional? What about terrorism, murder, or a litany of other heinous violent crimes?

Catching child pornographers should not involve subjecting innocent people to scans and searches. Frankly, I don&#x27;t care if this &quot;CSAM&quot; system is effective - I paid for the phone, it should operate for ME, not for the government or law enforcement. Besides, the imagery already exists by the time it&#x27;s been found - the damage has been done. I&#x27;d say the authorities should prioritise tracking down the creators but I&#x27;m sure their statistics look much more impressive by cracking down on small fry.I&#x27;ve had enough of the &quot;think of the children&quot; arguments.

Apple's plan to “think different” about encryption opens a backdoor to your life