It&#x27;s an idiom [1].[1] - <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;idioms.thefreedictionary.com&#x2F;hope+against+hope" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;idioms.thefreedictionary.com&#x2F;hope+against+hope</a>

When a US senator expressed upset with Wikileaks, Amazon shut them down.  Not even a court order, just a tantrum from a politician.  If you really think Amazon aren&#x27;t cheerfully inviting the US government into their datacentres, you haven&#x27;t been paying attention.

&gt; Huge props to Apple - here&#x27;s hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this.Why against hope?

Not too sure about this. Keep in mind that in most commercially sold Android phones, closed source, self updating, Google Play Services is installed by the manufacturer with system level privileges. That alone is enough to create a non insignificant back door.

Nobody builds their Android from source. Nobody uses Cyanogenmod. And nobody runs Android on a phone where the entire stack is open source and blob free.Anyone who does is a rounding error.

Not necessarily.Despite the openness of Android&#x2F;AOSP, there are still, unfortunately, things like binary blobs for certain graphics chips and closed-source firmware for things like Wi-Fi chipsets. Given what we&#x27;ve seen agencies like NSA are capable of (intercepting hardware in transit to apply backdoors, paying off RSA to make Dual EC the default pRNG in their crypto libraries, etc.), them compelling a manufacturer of a component to include a backdoor in their closed-source blobs is no stretch of the imagination.Apple even has this problem: basebands in cellular modems are notorious for being the source of exploits in otherwise-secure phones.

With Google&#x27;s Android, this issue will never arise because Android is open source. Any attempt to plant a backdoor will be outright monitored by the community.

If government agencies has unfettered access to data, it undermines the reputation of these companies. For instance, in Europe, many companies and organisations are likely even more hesitant to use Google&#x27;s services since the Snowden leaks. This is a large loss of potential revenue.Google has been (even more) proactive about security and encryption since then, since part of their business model relies on trust.

&gt; Why wold Google and Facebook get behind this? They store their customers data in a way they can access and subsequently have to give it to persecuters when there&#x27;s a court orderExactly like Apple. Or do you think that the emails in iCloud are not given to the prosecutors?

Was going to point out that you spelt &quot;prosecutors&quot;as &quot;persecutors&quot;, but then realised you might have genuinely meant that spelling!

Because their SSL certificate authority is going to be the next one to be legally compelled to sign something.

Why wold Google and Facebook get behind this? They store their customers data in a way they can access and subsequently have to give it to persecuters when there&#x27;s a court order

It used to be possible to do what you describe (cutting power at the right moment) and there were even physical bruteforce devices built to implement this but it&#x27;s all been hardened in iOS 8  and there are no currently known ways to bruteforce a passcode. Obviously there might theoretically exist a software bug to do so, but there&#x27;s no information around and it sounds even FBI couldn&#x27;t find it if it exists

&gt; with the exception that providing an easy means to brute force a phone to the authorities sets a horrible precedentThis is the entire concern (in my opinion and in my reading of Tim Cook&#x27;s opinion). If the government can force Apple to backdoor this one iPhone (because terrorist), then they can force Apple to backdoor any iPhone for any person given a valid warrant, subpoena or otherwise granted power. Once the flood gates open...

&gt; they may be kicking up a whole lot of fuss over a relatively minor issueI strongly disagree. They are taking a stance in the debate about government mandated backdoors in software.

The problem is with the legal prescident this would provide. Although right now it&#x27;s just limited to once specific use case, this ruling could and would be used in the future to require Apple (and other tech companies) to compromise security in ever increasing scope.

Hypothetically, it should be relatively simple to prevent a power-off-dodges-destructive-action attack, by simply making the operation (incrementing and storing the attempt counter, checking the password) an atomic operation.So they would still get 10 bites at the cherry, and sure, on the tenth, they could depower the phone and prevent the wipe, but if each attempt is persistently stored before the password-check is carried out, depowering the phone wouldn&#x27;t give them any more chances.

&gt; sets a horrible precedentThat&#x27;s a large part of the fuss!

Did you read the release? They are up front that its entirely an issue about setting a bad precedent. Its completely and totally about the fact that it would be used over and over again, and nothing to do with the fact that is it possible. Your overly cynical stance on this is misguided, as you seem to not have grasped the information in the letter.

What it sounds like is they&#x27;ve been asked to prepare a new OS release that allows an unlimited number of attempts to enter the passphrase via some network link. The press release is written to sound like without a software release, it wouldn&#x27;t be possible to mount this kind of attack, however attacks like this are generally possible regardless of having some specially modified and signed OS image: for example, by cutting power to the hardware precisely when it is clear a password was incorrect, before the hardware has time to implement any destructive actions. Attacks like this have been used against SIM cards since the 90s.I&#x27;m ambivalent regarding Apple&#x27;s stance. In principle they are doing the right thing, but in practice, it seems they may be kicking up a whole lot of fuss over a relatively minor issue (with the exception that providing an easy means to brute force a phone to the authorities sets a horrible precedent). As for creating a universal backdoor, it seems highly unlikely they couldn&#x27;t produce a signed OS &#x2F; coprocessor firmware image that wasn&#x27;t locked to one of the various serial numbers associated with this particular deviceedit: as mentioned below, this order entirely originates with Apple&#x27;s use of DRM to prevent software modification. Had users actual control over the devices they own the FBI wouldn&#x27;t need to request a signed firmware in the first place. Please think twice about what Apple might really be defending here before downvoting

Talk is cheap and these internet posts - from Tim Cooke, you, and me - are just talk. The security of this nation depends on Apple (and Google et. seq.) supporting us with its dollars as much as possible.And I&#x27;m not optimistic that the stockholders care about anything more than doing the opposite.

Absolutely. I&#x27;m quite amazed they had the guts to go through with this and I applaud it. I will support them with my dollars as much as possible.

Not possible without backing it into iOS with some update that FBI is claiming will be used on one particular phone in this particular case.Apple reasons that there is no way to guarantee no one will take the same update and apply it to other iOS devices. Or government taking this a step further by making Apple to build that into future update for the whole user base.

What it means is that the best the FBI can come up with is &quot;Make a way for us to brute force attack the passphrase.&quot; And brute force attack is worthless for a strong enough passphrase. That&#x27;s what is reassuring.Not to mention that this is for the iPhone 5c. As other comments have mentioned, newer iPhones have the hardware-based Secure Enclave which add to the difficulty of breaking into the phone. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf</a>

It&#x27;s not a backdoor to the phone only being unlocked by the passphrase, but a backdoor to the number of attempts limitation.

I agree. I was under the impression that Apple&#x27;s security was such that even they didn&#x27;t have the power to decrypt a device because the crypto made it impossible without the password&#x2F;pin&#x2F;key. I&#x27;m interested to understand the reasons that it was not done this way.

I think they&#x27;re being asked for a few things—private keys and the ability to automate and not limit passcode entry attempts.

In the world of cryptography, it is always possible, because you can always be lucky and guess the right &quot;unlock&quot; code. In fact, social engineering is normally used to find the right &quot;unlock&quot; code[0].The FBI can also unsolder the components in the phone, make a full image of the content, find the encrypted section and then brute-force. This is what is done for SSD. They do not power up the drive, unsolder, put the memory modules in a special reader and copy the data before the controller of the SSD automatically wipe out data because of automatic optimization after a delete&#x2F;trim.[0]: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;xkcd.com&#x2F;538&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;xkcd.com&#x2F;538&#x2F;</a>

They didn&#x27;t make any mention of how feasible it would be, just that they wouldn&#x27;t even try because it would threaten the security of their users.

It sounds like it&#x27;d be trivial to nop out the timer on repeated passcode attempts. Which makes sense... Leaving any short passcode trivially crackable.

&gt; If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn&#x27;t it mean that the backdoor existsSchroedinger&#x27;s Backdoor? ;)

Only Apple has the ability to sign updates to software (barring jailbreak).

It&#x27;s not a backdoor, it&#x27;s a frontdoor. In cryptography, there&#x27;s no way to make repeated attempts more computationally expensive. The lockout just an extra feature Apple put on, that Apple could easily remove. If we&#x27;re going to have 4- and 6- digit PINs, there is no way to stop a dedicated attacker frome brute-forcing it. None.

But why would you even think apple, google or facebook would be a good bet to defend your privacy in the first place ? They got the most terrible track record of not caring about.If you have things that you need to be private, don&#x27;t put it on a smartphone.

I don&#x27;t see how this &quot;reassuring&quot;; to me it&#x27;s rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments).If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn&#x27;t it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially?And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn&#x27;t the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to build it?&quot;Impossible&quot; should mean &quot;impossible&quot;, not &quot;not yet done, but possible&quot;.

This is not apparent from the article.  Where could I find out about this ability?

Freedom from forced update is one of Stallman&#x27;s motivations for free software.Just one terrorist attack + PR letter to customer + forced update away from loosing encryption on your phone.

This isn&#x27;t the case with the newer devices though, where the delays and key destruction are enforced in hardware, and tampering would destroy the key.

I&#x27;d also like to point out that Apple has a record of not practicing cautiously to security exposure, like _the inclusion of CNNIC root certificate despite the public exposure of security breach_.<a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;apple.slashdot.org&#x2F;story&#x2F;15&#x2F;04&#x2F;09&#x2F;1531237&#x2F;apple-leaves-chinese-cnnic-root-in-os-x-and-ios-trusted-stores" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;apple.slashdot.org&#x2F;story&#x2F;15&#x2F;04&#x2F;09&#x2F;1531237&#x2F;apple-leave...</a>

&gt;The fact that they can push weak OS updates to a locked phone is the backdoor.This times nine hundred and eleven thousand.

+1. If it is possible to push software updates to a &quot;locked&quot; phone then is this not tantamount to remote code execution with root privileges, and hence the BACKDOOR ALREADY EXISTS?&quot;Locked&quot; seems like an improper term for such a scenario.I applaud apple for appealing this case to the public however there is a HUGE HUGE difference between &quot;we can&#x27;t unlock&quot; and &quot;we shouldn&#x27;t unlock&quot;. This distinction will likely be lost on the general public unfortunately.

It may be that only the 5C or older devices have the ability to push a custom OS update to a locked device.The real problem is that you don’t want to set any precedent at all. Once it’s possible to do something for the 5C, weasel words can be introduced to make claims like “well: now you must maintain the current level of access by law enforcement”. Next thing you know, that excuse can be used to interfere with all future hardware designs.

Exactly. Plus, all backups of the iphones on icloud are already unencrypted, so half of the phones are already indirectly unlocked.EDIT: backups are encrypted, but apple have the keys. See below.

I&#x27;m not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone.What Tim Cook wrote is that
&gt; &quot;install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation.&quot;
&gt; &quot;the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.&quot;So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG&#x2F;Flash programmer on an internal connector to manually write new software, or they could desolder the Flash holding the old OS and place a new one.Both of these techniques are common enough in the embedded industry that I expect this is what Apple means. They probably can&#x27;t push an OTA software update and force the install on a locked device.

I&#x27;m afraid that I have to agree with you here. But Apple (and the FBI) recognize that this is the first salvo in a battle that will rage for MANY years. These early skirmishes could dis-proportionally affect the outcome - hence the ensuing PR battle.

I found this article about this [1] to be rather enlightening.1) <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.trailofbits.com&#x2F;2016&#x2F;02&#x2F;17&#x2F;apple-can-comply-with-the-fbi-court-order&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;blog.trailofbits.com&#x2F;2016&#x2F;02&#x2F;17&#x2F;apple-can-comply-with...</a>

It&#x27;s not just PR.  It&#x27;s actually really hurting their company.  Weaker security means less data can be stored on the iPhone which means less need for it, which means fewer sales.

I thought the same thing when I read it. If Apple can do this, then it&#x27;s already a backdoor, and all the publicity of &quot;Even Apple can&#x27;t hack your phone&quot; was false. But it turns out this is an older 5C, not the new 5S and up. So those old phones were effectively backdoored.I agree that Tim Cook has spun it as if it&#x27;s not a backdoor when clearly it is. Still quite a hard-to-use one though. It seems like they need the physical phone and maybe Apple&#x27;s private key for signing updates.The idea that the act of writing software makes it insecure is silly though. The security doesn&#x27;t come from no-one having made the appropriate changes to iOS. If it was, that would be security through obscurity and any motivated hacker or the FBI could modify iOS themselves. It must be about signing the update so that it can actually be installed.

I&#x27;m afraid I&#x27;m too skeptical to get the same assurances as you.Apple accuses the FBI of playing language games with the term &quot;backdoor&quot;, but I think Apple has done the same. The fact that they can push weak OS updates to a locked phone is the backdoor. This means that they can already comply with the court order, and they likely will. This letter covers them from PR damage.

I think the question is less about whether or not a &quot;correct &#x2F; valid use&quot; of this new technology is acceptable.  The problem is that it&#x27;s impossible (once it exists) to guarantee it won&#x27;t be used in malicious ways.

Does Apple do an amazing job protecting their users&#x27; privacy? Yes! But frankly in this case I find the FBI makes more sense than Apple.Apple says:All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or permissionAs I understand, Apple complains about the introduction of this new threat model:<pre><code> 1. criminal steals someone&#x27;s iPhone,
 2. gets hold of a special iOS version that Apple keeps internally to assist the government,
 3. pushes the OS update to the iPhone by themselves,
 4. uses some tool to automate brute-forcing the user passcode
</code></pre>
At least that&#x27;s what I get from these excerpts:Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation.The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer.Now how serious is this threat? And how useful is it to have the FBI be able to look into a phone when they have a warrant? Does the balance between the right to privacy and the need to assist criminal investigation really tilt towards privacy in this specific case?Meanwhile there are serious threats that do affect a lot of users in practice, where Apple does a good job but could do better still such as:- Remote code execution on iOS (6 vulnerabilities in 2016 so far[1])- Phishing, brute force and social engineering attacks (the improved two-factor authentication is not yet available to everyone[2])Am I wrong in thinking that users are way more likely to be affected by these threats except when the government has a warrant?If Apple is actually worried about the FBI getting access to the modified iOS version, they should focus their complaint on that and propose to do the whole data extraction in-house.[1] <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cvedetails.com&#x2F;vulnerability-list&#x2F;vendor_id-49&#x2F;product_id-15556&#x2F;year-2016&#x2F;opec-1&#x2F;Apple-Iphone-Os.html" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.cvedetails.com&#x2F;vulnerability-list&#x2F;vendor_id-49&#x2F;pr...</a>[2] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;support.apple.com&#x2F;en-us&#x2F;HT204915" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;support.apple.com&#x2F;en-us&#x2F;HT204915</a>

Let&#x27;s get behind Google, Facebook, and Amazon in their desire to not to hand over our data to the government.Even with as much data as each of them has, it&#x27;s still better that the data isn&#x27;t given to yet another party (the government, or each other).

Let&#x27;s get behind Google, Facebook and Amazon to protect our privacy?

I can&#x27;t disagree with your point of view; I merely point out that a world where everyone who wants a secure smartphone needs to own their own smartphone factory isn&#x27;t a very practical world.

Considering how many massive, gaping security flaws have been found in Open Source software in the last year or so alone that have been in place for years or decades, I think we can say that open source software cannot be trusted either.

Like you, I appreciate the sentiment - happy to hear Apple speaking up. However this shouldn&#x27;t change how we use Apple products. I operate under the implication that the device is compromised from the factory. Closed source software cannot be trusted, good faith is not enough.

Goole makes Android; Amazon makes FireOS. No idea what&#x27;t the deal with Facebook is.&gt; Really? If the FYI requests any data, they hand it over...?They have to, there&#x27;s no legal wiggle room here. Creating backdoors OTOH seems to be sufficiently legally questionable that Apple can risk noncompliance.(Of course, Apple could not accumulate all that data in the first place, but that would be silly, obviously. Now please sync your wifi passwords to iCloud.)

Would you complain about Apple handing in information to solve the murder of a loved one? Why is it always the &quot;bad government&quot; argument? It&#x27;s not that it doesn&#x27;t happen, but usually those requests are aimed towards more &quot;mundane&quot; cases.For example, I have friends who work in law (though not in the US), and the number 1 data request -which is revised by a judge, and only then given by companies- are call logs from telephones (just from&#x2F;to, date, time, duration, nothing fancy). And this are extremely helpful and information rich, if you know how to use them.

... you can&#x27;t just ignore a subpoena if you wish to do business in the US. providing a backdoor is different

What do you want thone other companies to get behind? They don&#x27;t manufacture phones like Apple does, right...?Note that this letter says: &quot;When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it.&quot;Seels like that detail is getting very little attention in this announcement. Really? If the FYI requests any data, they hand it over...?

Isn&#x27;t it odd that this press release spends so much time discussing encryption? Neither the FBI nor Apple will be touching any encryption functions of the device.It seems the primary aim of this statement is to prevent rumors that would spook Apple users into thinking their data is fair game

The encryption key used on the root filesystem is too hard to brute force.  It&#x27;s not based on some crappy password that a human created, it&#x27;s some hash value stored in the hardware.  In a scenario like that it is easy to create a key that would require all of the computers working till the heat death of the universe to crack.

The government wants Apple to disable the auto-erase after so many unlock attempts. Apple argues in this letter that with modern computing power, this amounts to a backdoor.The details of the gov&#x27;t request are in another story on the HN front page<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.techdirt.com&#x2F;articles&#x2F;20160216&#x2F;17393733617&#x2F;no-judge-did-not-just-order-apple-to-break-encryption-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-to-create-new-backdoor.shtml" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.techdirt.com&#x2F;articles&#x2F;20160216&#x2F;17393733617&#x2F;no-ju...</a>

Google worked with the NSA and Facebook not only worked with the NSA, but now has ties to China and the Chinese government (which have the most advanced spying and censoring Internet technology around).So, I&#x27;m doubtful.

&quot;From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called &quot;back door&quot; requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple&#x27;s users.&quot;To be fair - the only reason he&#x27;s doing it is because it would cause a significant drop in sales for Apple devices. People overseas would immediately stop buying because &quot;The American government is listening&quot;, and that&#x27;s assuming countries like China and Russia wouldn&#x27;t ban them outright.This is the big thing American politicians are missing or glossing over in their campaigns to get re-elected: Forcing American companies to compromise their products will result in a significant loss of revenue overseas. Microsoft, Google, et al, have already reported it and foreign governments have already started banning goods&#x2F;services (due to the Snowden revelations).

They don&#x27;t even have to do that. They wrote the OS, they have the signing key for OS updates. All they need to do is push an update to the device with a backdoor that allows reading off the unencrypted contents post-boot (possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it&#x27;s stored in).The only way to secure the device against that would be to have the users manually memorize and key in a complete 128 bit encryption key, which they could then refuse to provide.I think we tech folks were fooling ourselves with the idea that Apple had somehow delivered a &quot;snoop-proof&quot; device. They really didn&#x27;t (no one can!) as long as they&#x27;re subject to government or judicial control.

&gt; That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security.Is this true? That would have to mean that either the passphrase is stored on the device or that the data is not encrypted at rest. Neither of these sound likely, frankly

&gt; They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security.When a passcode is entered, the SoC queries the Secure Enclave with the passcode. If the passcode is correct, the Secure Enclave responds with the decryption key for the flash storage.The best Apple could do is sign a malicious update to the Secure Enclave firmware that either removes the time delays or dumps the keys. However, some people suspect the SE erases its secrets on firmware update, although this behavior isn&#x27;t documented in Apple&#x27;s security reports.

In a lot of consumer devices, JTAG is at least partially disabled (sometimes they can throw a fuse that only lets you do boundary scan for manufacturing).I would not be surprised at all that Apple&#x27;s internal &#x27;backdoor&#x27; (if you can call it that) is just resetting the security enclave, essentially erasing everything on the NAND. That&#x27;d be fine for refurb&#x2F;manufacturing, desirable even as that guarantees that full system wipes happen before a refurb goes to a new customer.

&gt; That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security.No, they can&#x27;t. A quick update to recent hardware practices: modern SoCs like Apple&#x27;s have something called &quot;Secure Enclave Processor&quot; that&#x27;s on-die. This is the first thing to start when the chip is powered up, the thing that loads a cryptographically-signed bootloader, and the thing that gates a lot of IO with the outside world (like the NAND).Hardware encryption on consumer hardware has existed for over a decade (look up Intel&#x27;s TPM), and while it hasn&#x27;t obviously taken hold on the more open Intel world, locked-down hardware platforms like Apple&#x27;s top-to-bottom design has had much more liberty in implementing secure computing.Furthermore, all debug&#x2F;probing features can be disabled by fuses at the factory. The manufacturer can test the chip with those features on, and once verified, blow those fuses. No-one&#x27;s JTAG-debugging that chip, not even Apple.That said, Apple&#x27;s focus on security and privacy ramped up in recent years. You want more secure, get more recent hardware. The downside, of course, is that if even Apple can&#x27;t hack the software... neither can you.

The Air Force and the FBI are different organizations wth different missions. I suppose they are both under the executive branch.

&gt;&gt;&gt; I am really glad that one of the most valuable companies in the world is drawing a bright line in the sand. So I really support Tim&#x27;s position on this one.Tim&#x27;s position today might not be apple&#x27;s position tomorrow. Apple is a large publicly traded company. They owe a duty only to shareholders. Fighting this fight will probably impact the bottom line. Tim&#x27;s continuation may turn on the outcome.Cooperation may see Apple hurt. The perception of cooperation was part of RIM&#x27;s fall from grace. Non-cooperation may also cause issues. Through it&#x27;s various agencies, the US government is Apple&#x27;s largest customer, as it is Microsoft&#x27;s. Large contracts might be on the line should Apple not play ball. Either way, this order has probably wounded Apple.

&quot;.. what this means is that even Apple can&#x27;t break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint.&quot;That is not exactly true. They wrote the OS, they designed the phone, they know where the JTAG connectors are. Cracking the phone apart and putting is logic board up on a debugger would likely enable them to bypass security.From what I understand Tim is doing, and I greatly admire, is trying to avoid a judicial requirement that they be able to do this on demand. The so called &quot;back door&quot; requirement, because he knows, as others do, that such a feature would be used by more than the intended audience, and for more than the intended uses, to the detriment of Apple&#x27;s users.What I really find amazing is that I was at a talk hosted by the East-West Institute where the Air Force General of the new cyber command (whose name escapes me) complained that &quot;we&quot; (silicon valley) had let the government down by not writing strong enough crypto to keep our adversaries out. I remarked that it was the ITARS regulation and the Commerce department at the behest of the NSA which had tied our hands in that regard, and that with a free reign we would have, and could do, much better. Whit Diffie was there and also made the same point with them. And now, here we are 10 years later, and we &quot;fixed&quot; it, and now its our fault that they can&#x27;t break into this stuff? Guess what? Our adversaries can&#x27;t either!The right to privacy, and the right of companies to secure that right with technology for their customers, is a very important topic and deserves the attention. I am really glad that one of the most valuable companies in the world is drawing a bright line in the sand. So I really support Tim&#x27;s position on this one.

When I forgot the password for my iPhone I tried untill it said &quot;connect to ITunes&quot; when I connected to iTunes nothing happened so I clicked restore realised I had not backed up my iPhone so I clicked backup hoping that it would backup but it said that I needed to sign in this then relied the boundary of not letting me type the password in or holding me back. So I have created a program that repeatedly does that. (There are no need for fancy backdoors)

&gt; here&#x27;s hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind thisI would assume that Google, Facebook, and Amazon are already sending every single keystroke we type straight to all the three letter agencies pretty much in real time. (I also assume the same about Apple, so I&#x27;m not sure what to make of this open letter.)

Important to remember: All iPhones since the 3GS have oleophobic surface coating (which combined with cloth pockets means the screen stays relatively clean). Also important to remember, fingerprints on a random surface are VERY hard to copy onto latex milk or PCB substrate.Please continue to think

Important to remember:  Anyone who has your phone also has an object covered in your finger prints.  Don&#x27;t rely on Touch ID for actual security.

&gt; Huge props to AppleThey may be doing it for people right to privacy, but don&#x27;t forget they might also be doing this because their image would become tainted irrevocably if they complied with this. Trust in Apple devices would be shattered (across those who currently trust Apple).

Because a gag order would have to be absolutely legally watertight, which is likely impossible in this case.

What puzzles me is why the government didn&#x27;t impose a gag order like they sometimes do in cases like this.

When entering any questionable law enforcement situation (TSA, walking near a protest, traveling internationally) I always switch my phone to not use TouchID. Say what you will.

&quot;...and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint.&quot;As long as we&#x27;re on the topic of encryption, phones, and law enforcement it&#x27;s worth keeping in mind that in the US at least courts can compel you to unlock your phone with Touch ID, even though they can&#x27;t compel you to give them a password. Communicating a password is considered speech, so self-incriminating speech is protected by the fifth amendment. Physically holding your finger to a device is not considered speech and so it&#x27;s not protected.I think this is an interesting, and perhaps underappreciated, aspect of a shift from passwords to biometrics for verifying identity. It would shift the power dynamic between civilians and government a bit - here in the US at least.Of course, hopefully no one is in a situation where they need to protect themselves against over-reaching or unjust government officials any time soon.<a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.engadget.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;10&#x2F;31&#x2F;court-rules-touch-id-is-not-protected-by-the-fifth-amendment-bu&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.engadget.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;10&#x2F;31&#x2F;court-rules-touch-id-is-n...</a>

it&#x27;s probably pretty safe to assume google did the opposite

What this says to me is that the current iPhone encryption is able to be broken by Apple. Note: &quot;[the FBI is asking us to] make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation.&quot; I interpret that as there is already a backdoor, but one that is controlled by Apple. If that is the case, the gov&#x27;t is asking for dual control of that pre-existing backdoor in addition to Apple. If I encrypt a message with a public key, and Phil Zimmerman can decrypt it (in addition to the holder of the private half of that public key), then there&#x27;s a backdoor in PGP, regardless of who owns&#x2F;knows about it. The only secure system is one where the data is well and truly unrecoverable if the private key is gone, missing, or unavailable&#x2F;unwilling to be applied by the owner.

Huge props to Apple - here&#x27;s hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this.One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end:&quot;The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer.&quot;This is actually quite reassuring - what this means is that even Apple can&#x27;t break into an iPhone with a secure passphrase (10+ characters) and disabled Touch ID - which is hackable with a bit of effort to get your fingerprint.

if you are interested in the technical details of iOS security: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf</a>

&gt; Why should a smartphone be any different just because Apple says it is ?Because it is possible to create a smartphone that is impossible to break into. The others it is impossible to create one that is impossible to break

&quot;the police can search property, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, vehicles, etc.&quot; - that they can, doesn&#x27;t mean it is right. If you read the entire letter, you&#x27;ll see that creating the backdoor means tomorrow the Chinese government can see the nude pics on your phone (with &#x27;due legal process&#x27;, of course).

Exactly. I think OP is a bit fast and loose on the definition of area of interest.It&#x27;s not that it&#x27;s bad if it&#x27;s this case. It&#x27;s that is bad if it applies as a built-in backdoor for whenever they feel like using it.

Am i missing something but aren&#x27;t safeboxs and vehicles already made &quot;unlockable by design&quot;?I am positive banks can open those things, and vehicles are inherently &quot;openable&quot;, so I do not quite get the point here.

This is not the government asking to search a single vehicle or safebox, to take your examples. This is the government asking that every safebox or vehicle in the world be made instantly unlockable by design.

Well the FBI would have to have the iPhone in their possession to unlock it I presume.  SO that&#x27;s one level of security - I don&#x27;t think the USA has become a place where property can just be confiscated without reason (I hope I am right here).  If Apple were custodians of the unlock process then only once due legal process had been followed would an iPhone be unlocked i.e. Apple would own the unlocking mechanism.  Maybe in the CEOs safe...

Does Apple really have to create a &quot;master&quot; key though? Couldn&#x27;t Apple write the backdoor that would only activates on the iPhone in question? Even if it was something as simple as &quot;if (secure_id == terrorist_phone_id) [accept any pin]&quot;, it&#x27;s not like the FBI could remove the condition without invalidating the signature. If they could, they wouldn&#x27;t need Apple&#x27;s help to begin with.

The major difference is that a warrant to access a safety deposit box allows the keys for that specific safety deposit box and no other. What the FBI is asking for is the equivalent of asking for a master key to all the safety deposit boxes to access just the one box. Given what was revealed in the summer of 2013 by Snowden, I think we&#x27;d all agree that the FBI and other state agencies (not just American agencies) will use the software as a backdoor to access whichever iPhone they choose. Let&#x27;s not be naive.

I don&#x27;t think that the police can compel you to not make a very good safety deposit box, just to compel you to open it if you have the capabilities.I agree that due process should compel Apple to unlock if they have the capabilities to. But no subpoena can beat math, right?EDIT: I just realised that what the FBI is talking about is a backdoored version of iOS. To me the compromise seems to be writing the backdoored version but leaving it in Apple&#x27;s hands (so Apple could send the FBI the data but not send them the OS). The only problem with that, of course, is that such a backdoored version could then be taken by a judge.Honestly, it seems like the judge could force Apple to hand over the OS update signing keys to the FBI...

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The issue they&#x27;re talking about is that by creating a back door it&#x27;s not limited to a single iPhone. Once there&#x27;s a way in then anyone with that knowledge can use it on any iPhone to access encrypted data.That seems a lot different from getting a search warrant and having the right to go through your belongings.

&gt; With the due legal process the police can search property, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, vehicles, etc. etc. Why should a smartphone be any different just because Apple says it is ?Because the &quot;master key&quot; alluded to in the letter is ethereal and can be duplicated (as opposed to handed over). This means:- Since the key can be duplicated, there is no serious way to ensure that only the police (or any other legally entitled organ) can do the search. Anyone who can get it will have police-level access to anything and will be able to offer police-level access to anyone. The &quot;anyone&quot; in question can be a former policeman who hates life, some script kiddie, the Chinese and so on -- and neither of these people are likely to care much about the &quot;due legal process&quot;.- The police can trivially search it without the owner&#x27;s knowledge and without leaving evidence. The high costs in time and money are a reasonable deterrent for searching property, vehicles etc. without the due legal process. For an electronic device, that cost is practically zero.Regarding the first point -- for what it&#x27;s worth, a while ago, army regulations here required that all doors have a physical lock and key, even if they also had an access code, for precisely this reason. The access code or the card swiping were used to log access (i.e. everyone had their own card, access codes could be logged so that you at least knew when someone was entering etc.) but when a door was supposed to be locked for good (e.g. labs not in use during the night), they were locked with real keys and sealed with old-fashioned wax seals. The rationale was that breaking the lock required quite a little time (and maybe even some door banging), increasing the chances that someone who tried to break in would be discovered, and physical evidence of a break-in was fairly hard to erase, as opposed to a purely electronic break-in which was quick to do (just enter the code). I don&#x27;t know if this is true anymore, nor how common it was outside this part of the world, but it makes some sense.

Why do you assume that a &quot;due legal process&quot; will be followed every time, in every country?Or maybe you think it&#x27;s OK to do it just this once?Sort of the &quot;just the tip&quot; mentality here?The problem is that once such a capability is added to the OS, there is no going back. And it can then be used with or without your wonderful US due legal process, potentially by criminals and definitely by governments in countries where human and civil rights are a joke.

With the due legal process the police can search property, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, vehicles, etc. etc. Why should a smartphone be any different just because Apple says it is ?As much as I value privacy I really don&#x27;t agree with Apple&#x27;s stance here - if due legal process has been followed, why shouldn&#x27;t they be able to read the contents of an iPhone ?And yes I get that third party encryption can be used, which isn&#x27;t owned by Apple and that there&#x27;s little the authorities could do about it - but that&#x27;s not the case at hand here.

The security here is Apple&#x27;s signing key that is used to sign updates. If you believe RSA is safe (which I assume is being used) and the key has a reasonable length, throwing a couple of millions at it won&#x27;t bring you much.I guess what the FBI wants is a backdoored iOS version and to have Apple sign it with their signing key (which means that the FBI can use it over and over again).

&gt; The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn&#x27;t that mean it already exists?Quite likely.As I posted on the other discussion here: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11116343" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11116343</a>&gt; If it&#x27;s possible to make such a &quot;backdoored&quot; build of iOS, then there are state actors who will be throwing $Millions at doing it already, with or without any willing help from Apple.

The letter describes it:&quot;The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer.&quot;

This. Is Cook&#x27;s letter an apology for what they already had to do (but could tell no one about)?

The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn&#x27;t that mean it already exists?What Apple needs to do then instead of writing this letter, is release an update that closes this backdoor.

Not getting an iPhone, even secured - Check!I bet hardware vendors are just salivating at the concept of having to produce thousands of iPhone cracking docking stations.

I can&#x27;t upvote enough that excellent summary of the situation of software companies.One way to solve that would be to have governments support and subsidies open source software development, but I don&#x27;t see that happening in the next 5 years at the very least.

Actually, there is a third business model which doesn&#x27;t exploit its users&#x27; privacy, nor does it have to resort to closed-source licensing (but selling add-on services like support and customization). This is the model adopted by companies like Red Hat, Canonical and to some extent Google (in a few products).The future, in fact, belongs to this third business model that helps a business earn profits without hurting its users in any manner. Ultimately, all the IT companies will have to embrace this model in order to stay in the market and survive. Competition will ensure that they will.

There are basically two groups of large software companies around right now: those which make their business by collecting data, and those which make their business by licensing software[1]. The first group has an overwhelming incentive to not support privacy too strongly. The second group has an overwhelming incentive to not allow too much openness. Until a better business model (or zero-knowledge machine learning) is found, no large for profit company can support both goals to their final conclusion[2]. So we are left choosing one evil or the other[3].[1] Sure, Apple only really sells hardware directly, but the software is a significant part of the reason a lot of people by Apple hardware (e.g. &#x27;Mac&#x27;s don&#x27;t get viruses&#x27;, &#x27;iPhones have a better user experience&#x27;).[2] Sure, Google has some significant internal efforts for supporting better user privacy (e.g. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;12&#x2F;an-update-to-end-to-end.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com&#x2F;2014&#x2F;12&#x2F;an-update-...</a> ) and Apple maintains some superb open-source software (e.g. <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;llvm.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;llvm.org&#x2F;</a> ). But in the end, Google can&#x27;t be a &quot;privacy company&quot; without hurting their business model and Apple can&#x27;t be an &quot;open source company&quot; for the same reason.[3] Or the non-trivial inconvenience of being a self-hosting free software purist

Keep in mind, it&#x27;s not just the courts ordering Apple to do this on a whim. The owner of the iPhone in question has literally consented to search.  It&#x27;s akin to the owner of a safe asking the safe company to open it up because he doesn&#x27;t have the combination, and the safe company can do it, but won&#x27;t because of the fear of a slippery slope.

Im generally not an apple supporter(i dont like the closed eco system), i am very plesantly surprised they posted this.I am quite disappointed that the us courts are trying to force apple todo this, and in my opinion, its just to use this case to set a precedent.I hope Apple cant get it to work, but id hate to see what the courts would do if that happened.

I really hope they actually physically can&#x27;t access the data on this phone. It&#x27;s entirely possible this could be the case -- I&#x27;ve been trying to consider the vectors they could use:- lightning cable delivered iOS patch (probably won&#x27;t work because iOS won&#x27;t negotiate over USB until you tap a dialog box)- OTA update (not connected to internet)- Cracking open the device and accessing the storage directly (encrypted until boot time)The most likely vector I can think of:- - Lightning cable delivered iOS patch from a trusted computer (i.e one that the terrorists actually owned)It&#x27;s quite impressive that Apple is taking a stand like this, though perhaps unfortunate timing WRT the larger encryption debate.

Even though the matters are slightly different, I couldn&#x27;t help but think that Cook is giving off a Boards of Canada vibe in this post (in a good way).&quot;Now that the show is over, and we have jointly exercised our constitutional rights, we would like to leave you with one very important thought: Some time in the future, you may have the opportunity to serve as a juror in a censorship case or a so-called obscenity case. It would be wise to remember that the same people who would stop you from listening to Boards of Canada may be back next year to complain about a book, or even a TV program. If you can be told what you can see or read, then it follows that you can be told what to say or think. Defend your constitutionally protected rights - no one else will do it for you. Thank you.&quot;<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;youtu.be&#x2F;1-FI6D8ZXpc" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;youtu.be&#x2F;1-FI6D8ZXpc</a>

Yeah. Loving your spouse and hiding things from them are also not mutually exclusive. Yet, you hardly find people that do both. Not to mention, this situation would never have arisen if iphone were open-sourced, since all activity would have been monitored by the community.

Maybe not, but they are strongly correlated. Strongly enough to make an aggressive assertion like &quot;You&#x27;re talking nonsense&quot; unwarranted at best.

You&#x27;re talking nonsense. Protecting users&#x27; privacy and keeping source code closed aren&#x27;t mutually exclusive.

This Apple?<a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.opensource.apple.com" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.opensource.apple.com</a><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;apple" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;github.com&#x2F;apple</a>

<a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lmddgtfy.net&#x2F;?q=define%20conflate" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;lmddgtfy.net&#x2F;?q=define%20conflate</a>

This is quite unlike Apple. Is this the same company that insists on keeping its source proprietary and is always against FOSS? The idea that you care for your users&#x27; privacy and still like to keep control on them by not giving them the freedom to modify source-code is not what I buy.

I was surprised that they felt it necessary but its pre-emptive counter to a pretty common argument - that smartphone makers are aiding and abetting terrorists by providing them encryption tools.

Well yes; look how this could play out on Main Street: &quot;Apple supports terrorists by opposing Obama Admin&#x27;s FBI investigation.&quot;

&quot;We have no sympathy for terrorists.&quot;They felt the need to state that, huh?

It&#x27;s been available for quite a while, long before iOS 7. It was at least available in iOS 5, probably available before that.

The FBI&#x27;s point is that Apple can update the software on the device to not honor that setting, which means it is not effective against a government attacker.

You can still enable full disk wipe after 10 failed password attempts[1]. That was available in iOS 7 I believe (but someone on here will correct me if I&#x27;m wrong).[1] - <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;i2.wp.com&#x2F;ioshacker.com&#x2F;wp-content&#x2F;uploads&#x2F;2014&#x2F;09&#x2F;Passcode-lock-erase-data.jpg" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;i2.wp.com&#x2F;ioshacker.com&#x2F;wp-content&#x2F;uploads&#x2F;2014&#x2F;09&#x2F;Pa...</a>

And to think, just two weeks ago that same enforcement which prevents compromising the secure enclave was the target of vitriol right here on HN (Error 53).

Publicizing the case themselves in a very good move.However, the iPhone of the attacker is an iPhone 5C, which does not have Touch ID or a Secure Enclave. This means that the time between passcode unlock attempts is not enforced by the cryptographic coprocessor. More generally, there&#x27;s no software integrity protection, and the encryption key is relatively weak (since it is only based on the user&#x27;s passcode).The amount of work needed to turn security into good user experience is phenomenal: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf</a>

if they can create it, they have the capability.

Please read carefully. They don&#x27;t have that capability. The FBI wants them to create it.

You&#x27;re not reading that, you&#x27;re implying it. It doesn&#x27;t say anything at all about remote installs, and it&#x27;s not even suggested.

Come on. It can be iOS update that waits until you enter the code or use touchID - and then sends the keys or decrypted data somewhere.

It doesn&#x27;t say anything about remote install - in fact it says &quot;physical possession&quot; several times.

What im reading is that apple can remote install an update that disable encryption. They dont want to do it.But that they have the capability is a bit scary.

Ok, so:
&quot;The UID allows data to be cryptographically tied to a particular device. For example, the key hierarchy protecting the file system includes the UID, so if the memory chips are physically moved from one device to another, the files are inaccessible. The UID is not related to any other identifier on the device.&quot;The secure enclave must still give it&#x27;s UID under some circumstances? This still does not appear to be immune to hardware hacking.Moreover, this UID can also be brute forced imo, when the memory chip and secure enclave are physically separated. Whatever is needed to de-encrypt the data must be brute force-able, especially when the memory is separated from the wipe-all-data initiator which does not seem to be impossible if you know the chip design well enough?

read section &#x27;Hardware Security Features&#x27; here: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.apple.com&#x2F;business&#x2F;docs&#x2F;iOS_Security_Guide.pdf</a>

Am I wrong to think that this brute forcing can still be applied when the raw memory chip is taken of the iPhone? The wipe-all-data-feature requires write access to the chip + some intelligence and monitoring. These capabilities should be physically removable from the actual memory chip, right?

If you&#x27;d like to claim damages, you would have to prove damages.

&gt;They will protect their customersWhere is this stated so that I can claim damages if they break said promise.I&#x27;m sorry, but how can it not be seen that it a really is bad sign that Apple has made this public. They may already have built the backdoor and this is a public stunt or no matter what you do, owning a smart is not that smart.

Very impressive letter. They&#x27;ve expressed their position in language that a layman can understand, there&#x27;s abundant evidence that they respect the intent of the law authorities, and even clearer evidence that they are drawing a line in the sand based on their principles. They will protect their customers.I wish more companies could speak so clearly and courageously.

Plot twist.This is actually the result of a barter. The Gov gets to have some low level TOP-SECRET access in trade for this easy access code and that Apple gets to go public to keep the populace calm and pretend they are fighting this thing.

They will probably produce some China-only version to please the government. A open letter like this, will instantly end their relationship with the government, they won&#x27;t even attempt to do it.

I was about to mention the Chinese case, the Chinese government asking foreign companies to install means of control and access in their products.Does that mean that apple will not provide such means or disable security for phones sold on the Chinese market? That would be surprising given the potential size of this market.

It makes sense for them.If they put a backdoor in iPhone for US government, they are effectively thrown out of Chinese market.Interesting enough, what will Apple do if Chinese government demand they to decrypt&#x2F;put backdoor in exchange of staying in the market?

If they beat the order they could always do what GP said, crack the password, and hand in a decrypted copy of the device. Everyone goes home happy: no precedent set, FBI gets their data, going into the future as old iOS devices die Apple won&#x27;t even be able to pull that stunt again if they want to.

Technically you&#x27;re right, legally think of the huge precedent. FBI is using the San Bernardino case as a legal crowbar, and it&#x27;s awful.

To make the backdoor general purpose, this line would need to be removed.Or the ID on the device be changed to match &quot;san_b_device_id&quot;.

One way around that is for Apple to make it extremely costly for courts to issue many of such orders, because after all Apple are free to charge whatever they like for doing this service.

Once they build that in for one device then they have opened pandora&#x27;s box.Then it becomes a precedent in the courts that Apple has this ability so they will issue court orders to make them comply for every single case where a phone is encrypted.

I&#x27;m really impressed that Apple is standing up to the government and protecting its users&#x27; rights. I&#x27;ve never really considered the iPhone worth the premium price tag, but policies like this have changed my mind.Could someone answer a question I have though? The government wants Apple to create this backdoor and tailor it to the specific device, so presumably it will have a line that goes<pre><code> if (!deviceID.equals(&quot;san_b_device_id&quot;)) 
 return;
</code></pre>
To make the backdoor general purpose, this line would need to be removed. But doing so would invalidate the signature and it can&#x27;t be resigned afterwards because the attacker won&#x27;t have Apple&#x27;s signing key. So is the open letter a matter of principle that they won&#x27;t build any backdoor, now or in the future, rather than a specific concern about this backdoor?

Well they seem to be saying that the approach they describe, to make a modified OS, would actually work to circumvent encryption on a preexisting device. That means that they already know the device is not really actually secure.They aren&#x27;t talking about putting a back door into systems to be used in the future, they are saying it&#x27;s indeed feasible to place a backdoor on a device already out there and then use the backdoor to access the device. That means the device is not actually secure.

Mods: can you please update title to add some context?

&gt;Also, prediction: if Apple refuses to build a brute forcer, someone else will do it and sell it to the FBI. Just wait and watch.Just made a downvoted to death comment on this very same thing. This is literally a government creating a market situation.

Also disables the auto-lockout on entering the wrong PIN enough times, as well as the delays after the 3rd (IIRC) incorrect attempt.

You are of course correct. I edited my comment.

But how can the custom iOS build be installed on the device while it is locked?

iPhone brute force hardware already exists [1]. The issue is that when Touch ID and&#x2F;or a passcode is enabled, the device locks itself for a few seconds-a few hours every time an incorrect pin is entered. So brute forcing would take an extremely long time.In addition, there is a setting on all iPhones to erase data after 10 failed pin code entry attempts.The FBI wants Apple to provide a custom iOS build that can be installed on the device that allows for remote (over the network) brute forcing with the increasing timeout&#x2F;erase data protections totally disabled.1. <a href="http:&#x2F;&#x2F;techcrunch.com&#x2F;2015&#x2F;03&#x2F;19&#x2F;iphone-bruteforce-pin&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">http:&#x2F;&#x2F;techcrunch.com&#x2F;2015&#x2F;03&#x2F;19&#x2F;iphone-bruteforce-pin&#x2F;</a>

Link to the FBI order: 
 <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;assets.documentcloud.org&#x2F;documents&#x2F;2714001&#x2F;SB-Shooter-Order-Compelling-Apple-Asst-iPhone.pdf" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;assets.documentcloud.org&#x2F;documents&#x2F;2714001&#x2F;SB-Shoote...</a>(Edit: deleted part where I was wrong. Thanks robbiet480 for correcting me. It&#x27;s 2am here and I was tired.)Also, prediction: if Apple refuses to build a brute forcer, someone else will do it and sell it to the FBI. Just wait and watch.

Massive props to Apple, again I am impressed by their commitment to customer privacy.

That doesn&#x27;t explain how they would get the update on to a locked and encrypted device, even if it existed.

&gt; Apple, if they chose to, can make a version of iOS that disables security features and encryption and load it onto existing phone even though the phone is locked and encrypted?As I understand it, the FBI wants Apple to create a version of iOS that would disable the current feature where the data is deleted after more than 10 failed passwords attempts. This would allow the FBI to brute force the password.

Thanks. This explains it. I was just thinking about my old Thinkpad X41. That had TPM module and hardware encryption. There&#x27;s nothing that IBM or the TPM manufacturer could&#x27;ve done to decrypt it (unless the TPM module already had backdoors, haha). Latest iPhones are basically the same?

See other comment: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11116439" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=11116439</a>Potentially, Apple cannot circumvent their own protections on some models (in software anyway), and could in others.

Because you can only deploy it, when you have Apple&#x27;s private key.

As you say, &#x27;Apple could create&#x27;. It doesn&#x27;t exist, what could the hacker even target?

And that&#x27;s one of the main reason for Apple to say no to that.There is no way that a backdoor like this could not be exploited by someone else if they found out the way to do it.The other one is that there is no way the government can guarantee Apple to only use in the &quot;right&quot; cases after they have access to it.

What I don&#x27;t understand is why Apple could create such software but a hacker could not exploit it.
I feel like that mean that there is already a backdoor.

Looking at the wording, seems to suggest they never state whether or not it is possible. It says &quot;the FBI wants us to make&quot;, not what we can or cannot make. &quot;Potential&quot; doesn&#x27;t mean certainty.

I think the important word missing in that phrase is &quot;any _future_ iPhone&quot;.For existing devices I imagine that a hypothetical iOSX which removes the protections would require you to enter your passcode so the OS can decrypt the data and then re-encrypt them using the new backdoored option.

I think the ask is for a custom recovery mode tool &#x2F; image.See <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theiphonewiki.com&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;DFU_Mode" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.theiphonewiki.com&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;DFU_Mode</a>Not same thing as an OS update.

This is interesting:&quot;Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.&quot;Am I reading this right? Apple, if they chose to, can make a version of iOS that disables security features and encryption and load it onto existing phone even though the phone is locked and encrypted?

What you&#x27;re saying sound like a win-win situation for Apple and its customers. So whatever the reason is for them to speak out, it&#x27;s a good thing that they do speak out. Isn&#x27;t it?

We&#x27;ve seen that bad that comes of corporations chasing a bottom line, perhaps this is the good.And honestly I don&#x27;t mind if my digital rights are defended as an advertisment.

I don&#x27;t see why it couldn&#x27;t be both - seems to me like they both believe in protecting privacy and (possibly even therefore?) follow a business model which deeply respects privacy.Seems to me both of those things are worthy of respect in today&#x27;s society.

No phone on earth runs the open source version of Android that you can download from git. They all run custom versions that include not only closed source personalizations to the system, but they also run lots of closed code as root (play services first and foremost).The reason why this doesn&#x27;t happen with Android is much more mundane: most Android phones are not encrypted so the FBI doesn&#x27;t need help to read all the customer data. They just need to open the phone and dump the flash.

Just because it&#x27;s open source doesn&#x27;t mean it&#x27;s safe. You have no control of what happens to that code before it gets installed on a phone. Samsung, whomever can and do modify the code -- those modifications aren&#x27;t generally open source.Ruby on Rails is open source but that doesn&#x27;t mean that all applications on rails are open source.

There are parts of Android phones that are closed and proprietary now. Even CyanogenMod.

&gt; open source, so there is no way they can plant a privacy-invading code and get away with thatCompare and contrast with today&#x27;s &quot;Typo in PHP&#x27;s Mersenne Twister&quot; story - <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;i0n1c&#x2F;status&#x2F;699860681487708160" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;twitter.com&#x2F;i0n1c&#x2F;status&#x2F;699860681487708160</a>Seems to have been broken since 2007 (the &#x27;broken&#x27; line appears in the 2007-01-01 commit &quot;Bump year&quot; but not in the 2006-10-06 commit &quot;Mark rand.c functions with U.&quot;)

You are right. What you say about Facebook is true, but Google&#x27;s Android is open source, so there is no way they can plant a privacy-invading code and get away with that.

So, their motivation is even better and more effective than idealism.

Exploiting is a bit loaded. Where I’m from, we call this “a free round”. There’s no downside to doing this, and a sizeable one to complying with the order. Still, it’s nice to see that Apple don’t hesitate, which makes me feel good about any other future challenge the feds will throw at Apple.

&quot;we believe the contents of your iPhone are none of our business.&quot;

If you want to describe Apple&#x27;s actions in terms of market competition, then you should also describe the consumer (our) reaction in similar terms.We as consumers should support the companies that have the best, in terms of product usability as well business ethic, market strategy by buying said companys product and recommending and commending their actions.So props to Apple for leading an ethical business strategy.

&gt; They are just exploiting that competitive advantage.... and that&#x27;s what I paid them for, thanks for not taking money both from me and from FBI :)

&gt; Apple is not doing this out of goodwill, or because they believe in protecting privacy.Personally I think this is ridiculous.If Tim Cook was born in a range of other countries around the world he would be persecuted and quite likely killed (and not in a pretty way). As such I am sure he is very aware that for many people their privacy is a life and death matter.Also there would be many people at Apple who would&#x27;ve been dealing with China&#x27;s aggressive attacks against their users and their own infrastructure and not be too pleased. And to a lesser extent their own government.I can&#x27;t imagine the extra few billion that comes from goodwill being a major factor in their efforts to go to all of this trouble.

Their business model just happens to align well with what is best for their customers. It&#x27;s interesting that it&#x27;s almost an anomaly. The business models of Goole and Facebook in comparison does not really align with what is best for their customers.Apple are a company so they&#x27;d be stupid to not take advantage of this and as a consumer I am happy that the premium I pay for Apple products is benefiting me.

Why wouldn&#x27;t they believe in protecting their customers privacy? In Apple&#x27;s case there is no conflict of interest to make you doubt that statement. If it came from Google or Facebook I would be more skeptical.

It will become obvious, I think, in the following days. If they challenge the court order and fight vigorously to have it lifted, I am willing to believe that it is about the privacy. If they give in and say, &quot;but we really didn&#x27;t want to, they made us do it&quot;, I will consider their resistance more of a PR stunt.That story, by the way, is really nice. ;-)

A man went to his local parish priest and asked &quot;Father, is it permissible to smoke while praying?&quot; &quot;No, my son, when praying you should show the utmost respect and attention to God&quot; he answered. The next day, another man asked the same priest &quot;Father, is it permissible to pray when I smoke?&quot; &quot;Of course, I encourage you to make your whole life one long prayer!&quot; was the priest&#x27;s answer.So, is Apple defending rights while advertising, or advertising while defending rights?

I see a lot of people saying they&#x27;re impressed, admired, etc. at Apple for doing this.It&#x27;s not about giving props: Apple is not doing this out of goodwill, or because they believe in protecting privacy. Apple has a competitive advantage against Google&#x2F;Facebook in that its business model does not depend on violating their customer&#x27;s privacy.They are just exploiting that competitive advantage.Cfr. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ar.al&#x2F;notes&#x2F;apple-vs-google-on-privacy-a-tale-of-absolute-competitive-advantage&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;ar.al&#x2F;notes&#x2F;apple-vs-google-on-privacy-a-tale-of-abs...</a>

Huge respect to Tim Cook for standing up for the personal information security of Apples users around the world. When a non tech demands something as stupid as a back door, they do not acknowledge how weak they make data security.

Good on them. I was hoping that they&#x27;d be able to manage a way to unlock this one without potentially breaking the whole model (by exploiting some bug in the presumably outdated version installed or something that wouldn&#x27;t positively degrade the security model), but given that that&#x27;s not the case then I think they&#x27;re making the right choice.

If in pursuit of an active investigation (i.e. the devices are still in active use), a police agency could invoke the All Writs act of 1789, and have Apple be instructed to introduce security vulnerabilities, with the next regular upgrade of iOS, such that after the phone is upgraded, it can be captured by the FBI, or whatever police force is involved, and the data recovered.A large percentage (and presumably the the target in question) will willingly (at least today) upgrade their iOS to whatever Apple pushes out - we don&#x27;t (for the most part) even question whether the purpose of that security patch is to reduce security.The only thing that secures an iPhone is the iOS following the rules of security such as the security enclave - it can just as easily (in a new release of iOS) be instructed to ignore it.What Apple&#x2F;Tim Cook are doing here, is standing up for the importance of not being required to hodge-podge be at the whims and mercies of police agencies that demand they do whatever is required of it.

The FBI asked Apple to install a firmware update in the RAM of the iPhone, by booting the iPhone in the DFU mode.

But how do you get the firmware updated on a locked phone?  My understanding is all updates (historically) have required the phone to be unlocked and connected to the internet?

The Apple 5C is an older phone not even manufactured by Apple anymore, and, for the longest time, Apple had capabilities that allowed them to brute force iPhones under direction of a court order. Apple has some concern, clearly, about it&#x27;s customer&#x27;s security, but doesn&#x27;t care as much about this particular iPhone Model&#x27;s security, as it does about the general principle that, without explicit legislation such as [1]CALEA 47 USC 1001-1010), that technology companies such as Apple would then come under the whim and direction of all sorts of requests - there is no explicit restraint in the All Writs Act of 1789 - they can now be told by police agencies to do effectively anything necessary to the pursuit of an investigation - and you know, with 100% certainty, that once the &quot;good cases&quot; are used as an excuse for this, the crappy follow on scenarios will also be making use of the All Writs Act of 1789.It&#x27;s massive, massive overreach - and if Apple doesn&#x27;t draw the line here, it will quickly spin out of control.[1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&#x2F;wiki&#x2F;Communications_Assistance_for_...</a>

I interpret as the OP does. The court document asks Apple to lock the particular image to a particular serial number, so if all goes according to plan, the same image could not unlock other iPhones. Obviously, writing security code on a short deadline does not make for the best security, so that&#x27;s one worry.But Apple&#x27;s letter uses the expression &quot;technique&quot;, which I think means they&#x27;re worried the government will get another court to make them change the serial number and sign a new image &quot;next time&quot;. Before you know it, Apple will have to have an entire department to make these one-off images. Someone will say, &quot;you know, you could save yourself a lot of time if you just made it work on any phone.&quot; Then that image will be leaked, and their security guarantees will be dead. (One might also worry about the DRM implications.)

You&#x27;re both accurate here:&gt; The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.Once there&#x27;s a backdoor, the legal precedence and technical capability will exist to use it on any device. The precedence would also exist to request support in backdooring other parts of the OS.It&#x27;s FBI Director Comey&#x27;s explicit goal[0] to destroy the notion of strongly secured encryption for civilians. From an an address to Congress July 2015:&gt; Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the growing challenges to public safety and national security that have eroded our ability to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to a court order or warrant. We in law enforcement often refer to this problem as “Going Dark.”[...]&gt; We would like to emphasize that the Going Dark problem is, at base, one of technological choices and capability. We are not asking to expand the government’s surveillance authority, but rather we are asking to ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has provided to us to keep America safe.In other words, encryption makes it harder for the FBI to collect people&#x27;s information. They therefore want to make sure encryption as implemented can&#x27;t block the FBI.Further on:&gt; The debate so far has been a challenging and highly charged discussion, but one that we believe is essential to have. This includes a productive and meaningful dialogue on how encryption as currently implemented poses real barriers to law enforcement’s ability to seek information in specific cases of possible national security threat.[...]&gt; We should also continue to invest in developing tools, techniques, and capabilities designed to mitigate the increasing technical challenges associated with the Going Dark problem. In limited circumstances, this investment may help mitigate the risks posed in high priority national security or criminal cases, although it will most likely be unable to provide a timely or scalable solution in terms of addressing the full spectrum of public safety needs.Encryption, when implemented in a way that legitimately secures a person&#x27;s data from unauthorized access, the FBI can&#x27;t just get in and take the data. Comey would like Congress to support policy and tools that can get around that, because terrorism.The Apple situation feels very foot-in-door to me.0: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.fbi.gov&#x2F;news&#x2F;testimony&#x2F;going-dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balances-between-public-safety-and-privacy" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;www.fbi.gov&#x2F;news&#x2F;testimony&#x2F;going-dark-encryption-tec...</a>

&gt; Apple making it abundantly clear, that if they comply (or are forced to comply) with the All Writs Act of 1789 to create this particular back door, then that opens the floodgate moving forward for all sorts of requests to add backdoors&#x2F;decrease security.I read it differently. Apple is saying that if they make this particular backdoor, then this very backdoor can also be used in other scenarios, to crack other phones (i.e. the backdoor would apply to all iPhones C, not just to this one).

Absolutely this.Additionaly, we simply don&#x27;t know on what other (FISA) occasion Apple has been forced to provide feature X to agency Y where Y is not FBI...

What makes you think the FBI, or a certain assisting agency, don&#x27;t already have CAs in their pocket? They only need one. The &#x27;rogue CA&#x27; threat that encouraged the development of HPKP covers this scenario. Hell, DNS TLSA records (which are a part of the now dead DANE concept) let you pin to any combination of PKI CA, public key, or certificate. One day we&#x27;ll regret not deploying this stuff.

And it&#x27;d seem to open the floodgates for certificate authorities to be compromised as well. What&#x27;s to stop the FBI from compelling a CA to create a special MITM certificate for a criminal investigation of a Yahoo user?

I&#x27;m surprised that nobody on this thread has commented on the real substance of this response. It has nothing to do with Apple brute forcing iPhones for the police (which it has done for years, with a simple court order) - but instead, is Apple making it abundantly clear, that if they comply (or are forced to comply) with the All Writs Act of 1789 to create this particular back door, then that opens the floodgate moving forward for all sorts of requests to add backdoors&#x2F;decrease security.It&#x27;s entirely possible, that the FBI can then use this precedent to simply have Apple remove all security from an iPhone in pursuit of an active investigation, which can be done with a straightforward firmware update - which IOS users tend to do without much thought.

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